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 Chapter One: Introduction 
The successful experiences from the practice of the “Open Door Policy” of China 
for the last twenty years prove that foreign investment not only exerts beneficial effects 
on the investment, consuming and employment sectors of the society1, but has extensive 
associated effects on the overall growth of the national economy as well. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI), especially, promotes the introduction of foreign capital, advanced 
technology and sophisticated management skills into China, and in turn furthers the 
economic transition and social reforms of China fundamentally.2
In 2002, China was rated as the “most attractive foreign investment destination” 
by the A.T. Kearney, a leading management consultant firm in its report of Foreign 
Direct Investment Confidence Index.3 In the same year, more than US$50 billion foreign 
investment flowed into China, which made it the largest recipient of FDI in the world, 
exceeding that of the United State in this year4. Both of them are positive news for China. 
However, in order to keep attracting foreign investment to continue the economic 
competitiveness of China in the next several decades, it is imperative to improve its legal 
environment, because a stable and transparent legal system can increase the confidence 
and credence of foreign investors.5 Admittedly, China has made considerable efforts to 
simplify its procedures for the entry and establishment of foreign investment, but several 
                                                 
1 According to a news report, during the last five years, there are about 50 thousand newly established foreign invested 
enterprises in China providing more than 5.5 million job positions. See International Finance Newspaper, Jan. 16, 
2003, at: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper66/8259/778421.html  
2 See Weng Guomin, “Some Problems of Reconstructing the System of the Chinese Foreign Investment Law”, Journal 
of Zhejiang University (Humanities and Social Sciences), Vol. 29 No.6, Dec.1999, at p132 
3 See “China Becomes the Most Attractive Foreign Investment Destination”, China Economic News, 2001.11.4, at p3 
4 See “China Top Destination for Foreign Investment”, China Economic News, 2003.1.6, at p3 
5 See Jian Zhou, “National Treatment in Foreign Investment Law: A Comparative Study from a Chinese Perspective”, 
spring 2000, 10 Touro International Law Review, at p45. The author believes that the establishment and development 
of the foreign investment legal framework should be considered as one of the key factors for the surge of FDI seen in 
China. 
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deeply-rooted problems remain unsettled. One of them is the differentiated legislation 
approach which results in the “double track system” in foreign investment legislation.  
Upon its accession to the WTO, it is expected that China will make its legal 
system more compatible with the international practices. As a matter of fact, the Chinese 
government has already revised a substantial number of laws and regulations in the 
foreign investment sector to make them conform to the TRIMs Agreement6. Although 
basically, WTO is a multilateral trade organization, it is slowly extending its scope to the 
area of international investment through TRIMs, GATS and TRIPs negotiations. 
Therefore it is believed that the implications of WTO entry to the Chinese foreign 
investment law won’t just confine to the specific amendments to the laws, it should have 
more far-reaching influence on the entire foreign investment legal framework7. China’s 
ongoing economic reform towards a free market economy is another crucial factor that 
would promote the transformation of Chinese foreign investment law. To create a fair and 
transparent competition field for all market entities is the inherent need of China’s 
market-oriented economic reform which calls for the elimination of unfair 
discriminations against different players in the market.  This thesis explores the current 
defects and problems existing in Chinese foreign investment law, and at the same time it 
tries to analyze the prospect of future development. It starts with an overview of the 
current foreign investment legal framework in China, and the emphasis will be placed on 
the latest development in the area. Defects in the current foreign investment laws will be 
discussed in detail. The paper continues with an analysis of the external (WTO accession) 
                                                 
6 Of course to keep conformity with the WTO rules is not the sole reason for such major legal amendments. As 
addressed below, China’s ongoing economic reform towards a more matured free market economy also performs 
important influence. 
7 See Liu Sun, WTO Rules and Its Influence to the International Investment Law, China Legal System Publishing 
House, 2001, at p 55-56 
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and internal (furtherance of market economy reform) factors shaping the transformation 
of the foreign investment legal framework, and it ends with a proposal to the 
reconstruction of the framework of Chinese foreign investment law.  
 One thing that shall be noted is that this thesis talks about foreign direct 
investment (FDI) only. As in a broad sense, foreign investment covers both FDI and 
foreign portfolio investment, which includes foreign investment in security market as an 
example. But actually, ever since the beginning of its economic reform in 1978, the 
Chinese government has always placed its emphasis on the encouragement of FDI8. The 
reason is multifold. Firstly, FDI is generally thought to be more beneficial to the host 
economy as it usually brings technology and management expertise to the invested 
enterprises in the host country alongside of capital. Secondly, the Chinese RMB is still 
not a free convertible currency under the capital account,9 which is particularly not 
welcomed by the international portfolio investors, because they cannot transfer their 
profits out of China easily due to the strict foreign exchange control. Most importantly 
maybe, the Chinese government became even more cautious in its steps to open the 
capital market after the financial crisis in Southeast Asia in 1996, which was believed to 
be initiated by the speculation activities of the “hot money” in the currency market10. 
Therefore, the Chinese foreign investment legal framework was basically established and 
                                                 
8 As a reflection, FDI accounts for more than 96% of all the foreign investment China had utilize between January and 
November in 2002. See the statistics posted on the official website of Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation of PRC (MOFTEC): http://www.moftec.gov.cn/table/wztj/2002_11.html.  
9 According to Article 4 of the Regulations on the Foreign Exchange System of the PRC, which was adopted by the 
State Council on April 4, 1996 and modified on January 14, 1997,  “The payment in and transfer of foreign exchange 
for current international transactions shall not be subject to the government control or restriction.” But capital 
transactions are still under strict regulation; see Chapter 3 of the same law. 
10 See “The Course and Cause of South-east Asia Financial Crisis”, Xinyuan Net News Center, at website: 
http://www.xyfund.com/102003/29/56247.html 
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developed on the narrow sense of foreign investment —— the FDI. It reflects the 
strategic choice of the Chinese government on utilization of foreign capitals.11
 Besides, Chinese foreign investment law, as an aggregate of numerous laws and 
regulations, governs the entry, establishment as well as the operation period of foreign 
investment. And in this thesis, research is focused on the laws governing the post-entry 
period of foreign investment, that is, the establishment and operation period of foreign 
investment. This is because the reasons behind China’s foreign investment legislation on 
market access are largely based on policy-considerations rather than legal reasoning. 
Whether or not to open a certain industry to foreign investors depends on an all-round 
examination of the industry’s importance to national security and national economic 
interests, its status in national economy and its development level in host country, etc.12 
The task to make such decisions shall be left to the economists and politicians instead of 
legal scholars. 
 
Chapter Two: Introduction and analysis of the Chinese foreign investment law 
I. Definition of “foreign investment” and “foreign invested enterprises” in China 
 1. Foreign investment 
Before the discussion of Chinese foreign investment law in this thesis, a basic 
question that should be clarified first is the definition of foreign investment: what are the 
legal criteria of “foreign investment” versus “domestic investment” in Chinese laws? The 
legal treatment for foreign investment differs vastly from that for the domestic investment 
in respect of establishment procedures, approval standards, taxation policy and tariff 
                                                 
11 Weng Guomin, supra note 2, at p133 
12 See Yan Wang, Chinese Legal Reform: The Case of Foreign Investment Law, Routledge, 2002, at p74 
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consequences, etc.; therefore, a set of clear criteria is essential to ensure that the proper 
laws are applied. However, in fact, no clear definition for “foreign investment” was 
provided by relevant Chinese laws or regulations. A practical approach generally adopted 
by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC)13 is to examine 
the source of the investment. If the investment comes from outside the territory of China, 
it is usually regarded as “foreign investment” even if it actually originates from Chinese 
nationals or Chinese companies. For the purpose of characterization of foreign 
investment, the Hong Kong SAR, the Macau SAR and the Taiwan Province are treated as 
being outside the territory of China.14 An exception to this “source standard” applies to 
the investment made by foreign-invested holding company. In nature, foreign-invested 
holding companies are Chinese legal persons and are within the territory of China. But 
the enterprises established by foreign invested holding companies in which the foreign 
equity are not less than 25% can enjoy the preferential treatment provided for foreign 
investment.15
2. Foreign invested enterprises and the “25% Rule” 
The definition of “foreign invested enterprises” is also essential to the 
understanding of the Chinese foreign investment law. Generally speaking, foreign funded 
enterprises usually take the forms of equity joint ventures (EJV), contractual joint 
                                                 
13 The Reform of State Council Organs Plan was adopted by the First Meeting of the Tenth National People’s Congress 
of China on March 10 2003. Article 4 of the Plan stipulates: “continuing to carry forward the reform of the 
administrative system for the circulation of merchandise and organizing the establishment of the Ministry of 
Commerce” and Article 7 reads: “no longer keeping the State Economic and Trade Commission and the MOFTEC”. 
Accordingly, now the MOFTEC has been replaced by the newly established Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and 
the latter takes all the responsibilities of the former MOFTEC. However, the previous regulations stipulated by the 
MOFTEC remain effective, if not repealed or replaced by later legislation. 
14 See Gu Mingkang, “Reconstruction of Foreign Investment Legal Framework on the Basis of Company Law” (Yi 
Gong Si Fa Wei Ben, Chong Gou Wai Zi Fa Ti Xi), Journal of International Economic Law (Guo Ji Jing Ji Fa Lun 
Cong), Vol.4, Law Press, at p449 
15 See Article 19 of the Provisions on the Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign Investors. 
For the Chinese text of the Regulation, see webpage: http://wzj.saic.gov.cn/pub/ShowContent.asp?CH=ZCFG&ID=50 
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ventures (CJV) or wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOE), which are collectively 
called foreign invested enterprises (FIE). According to Article 4 of the Sino-foreign 
Equity Joint Venture Law and Article 18 of Sino-foreign Contractual Joint Venture Law 
Implementing Rules, generally, foreign investors shall contribute not less than 25% of the 
registered capital of an EVJ or a CJV.  
Twenty-five percent foreign equity used to be a threshold for FIEs. This minimum 
requirement had been in effect for about 20 years, and was confirmed repeatedly by the 
MOFTEC and other PRC government departments in subsequent foreign investment 
legislations. For example, on Jan. 10, 1995, the MOFTEC issued the Provisional Rules 
for Certain Issues Regarding the Establishment of Foreign-Invested Joint Stock 
Companies 16, which restated that foreign investors’ capital contributions to a venture 
investment enterprise must be at least 25% of all capital contributions.17 As a result of the 
25% rule, an enterprise in which foreign equity accounts for less than 25% may 
encounter difficulties in achieving government approval and FIE business certificate18.  
 However, the control over foreign equity participation has been loosened recently. 
Since January 1, 2003, enterprises in which foreign equity accounts for less than 25% can 
also establish as FIEs and achieve FIE business certificate bearing annotation “foreign 
equity less than 25%”19. But nevertheless, the 25% rule remains essential. Because such 
FIEs are not allowed to enjoy preferential tax treatment provided for normal FIEs with 
                                                 
16 See Article 7 of Provisional Rules for Certain Issues Regarding the Establishment of Foreign-Invested Joint Stock 
Companies. For the Chinese text of the Provisional Rules, see webpage: http://www.00615.net/waizi/wf/w_22.htm  
17 See Article 7 of the Establishment of Foreign-funded Venture Investment Enterprises Tentative Provisions. Also see 
Christophe Han and Sidney Qin, “FIE Status and the 25% Rule”, China Law & Practice, Dec. 2001/Jan.2002, at p106 
18 See Christophe Han and Sidney Qin, supra note17 
19 See Article 2 of the Circulation on Several Issues concerning Strengthening of FIE Approval, Registration, Foreign 
Exchange and Tax Regulations. For the Chinese text of the regulation, see webpage: 
http://www.jsetc.gov.cn/showzhengce.jsp?Article_ID=9815 
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25% or more foreign equity20. In other words, these foreign invested enterprises only 
have the FIE title, but cannot receive the most important benefits provided for normal 
FIEs. 
 
II. Overview of the present legal regime of Chinese foreign investment law 
 1. Legal source 
The adoption of the Equity Joint Venture Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(the “EJV Law”) in 1979 marked the beginning of Chinese legislation in the foreign 
investment sector. Since then, Chinese foreign investment law has been significantly 
expanded, as various legislative bodies have enacted a huge number of laws and 
regulations to regulate the activities of foreign investment in China. It is reported that 
there are approximately 200 major laws and regulations effective today in governing 
FDI21. 
Although the legal source of Chinese foreign investment laws is complex, they 
can be categorized into three main levels of legislation. 
a. Constitution 
The legal protection of foreign investment in the Constitution, which is the 
highest legal authority in China, was first established in 1982 when the National People’s 
Congress (the NPC) of China adopted the revised Constitution (the 1982 Constitution). 
Article 18 of the 1982 Constitution reads: The People’s Republic of China permits 
foreign enterprises, other foreign economic organizations and individual foreigners to 
                                                 
20 See Circulation on the Tax Treatment of FIEs With Less Than 25% Foreign Equity, issued by the State 
Administration of Tax on April 18, 2003. For the Chinese text of the Circulation, see webpage: 
http://218.13.180.135/zhds/show_swfg.asp?id=1194 
21 See Cao Jianming, “WTO and Construction of Rule of Law in China” (WTO Yu Zhong Guo Fa Zhi Jian She), 
preface to WTO and the Judicial Judgment in China (WTO Yu Zhong Guo de Si Fa Shen Pan), 2001.12, Law Press, at 
p10 
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invest in China and to enter into various forms of economic cooperation with Chinese 
enterprises and other economic organizations in accordance with the law of the People’s 
Republic of China. 
All foreign enterprises and other foreign economic organizations in China, as 
well as joint ventures with Chinese and foreign investment located in China, shall abide 
by the law of the People’s Republic of China. Their lawful rights and interests are 
protected by the law of the People’s Republic of China. 22
It was the first time that the Chinese government acknowledged the legality of 
foreign investments in the Constitutional level. It provided a strong basis for the 
protection of foreign investment, as well as the legal basis for forthcoming legislation in 
the foreign investment sector.23
b. National Legislations 
This tier of legislation consists of two groups of laws: specific foreign investment 
laws24, and general laws that apply to both domestic-invested enterprises and FIEs. 
The first group of laws can be further divided into two parts: specific FDI laws 
adopted by the NPC and its Standing Committee, and regulations and rules issued by the 
State Council and its ministries25. Under the Constitution, the NPC and its Standing 
Committee are entitled to enact national laws regarding FDI. The three basic foreign 
                                                 
22 See Article 18, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which was adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth 
National People’s Congress and promulgated for implementation on December 4, 1982. The Constitution underwent 
amendments three times later (in 1988, 1993 and 1999 respectively), but this clause remains the same. 
23 Interestingly, the first foreign investment legislation, the EJV law, was adopted in the absence of a Constitutional 
acknowledgement. 
24 Here, the "specific foreign investment laws" refer to those laws and regulations that are specifically or mainly applied 
to foreign invested enterprises. In contrast, some laws, such as Chinese securities laws or land regulation laws apply to 
domestic-invested enterprises as well as FIEs. In a narrow sense, “Chinese foreign investment law” only refers to those 
specific foreign investment laws. But as we are talking about legal source, those general laws shall also be considered 
for integrity and accuracy. 
25 See Li Mei Qin, “Attracting Foreign Investment into the PRC; the Enactment of Foreign Investment Laws”, 
Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law, April 2000, at p161. 
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invested enterprise laws (FIE laws), namely, the Sino-foreign Equity Joint Venture Law 
(EJV law), the Sino-foreign Contractual Joint Venture Law (CJV law) and the Wholly 
Foreign Owned Enterprises Law (WFOE law), constitute the core of the entire foreign 
investment legal framework. There are also laws on taxation and foreign exchange 
regulation, etc. But one of the distinct features of the Chinese foreign investment 
legislation is that the focus of the legislation is placed on corporate forms, or in other 
words, the organizational structure of the enterprise, not on the regulation of the foreign 
capital.26 This legislative approach caused much complexity and confusion which will be 
addressed in detail later in this article. 
Besides the laws enacted by the NPC and its Standing Committee, the State 
Council and its ministries issued many administrative regulations and rules. For example, 
the State Council adopted the Regulations for the Implementation of the Equity Joint 
Venture Law of the People’s Republic of China (EJV Law Implementing Rules) four 
years after the EJV law was enacted. The EJV Law Implementing Rules provided 
detailed and practical rules for the Sino-foreign equity joint ventures, e.g., it enumerates 
the market access categories for joint ventures, lays out the application procedures, 
approval agencies and mandatory contents of joint venture contracts, regulates the labor 
management, use of land, transfer of technology, taxation, foreign exchange control, 
dissolution and liquidation as well as dispute resolutions of joint ventures27. Actually, 
compared to the EJV law which contains only 15 articles, the 118 article Implementing 
Rules is a more concrete and helpful guide to the foreign investors. Therefore, as the 
regulations and rules of the State Council and its various ministries usually details or 
                                                 
26 See Liu Jinke, “Discussion of the Several Issues Concerning the Re-construction of Chinese Foreign Investment 
Law”, Research on Financial and Economic Issues, March 2001, at p70. 
27 Jian Zhou, supra note 5, at p55 
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complements the relevant laws, they are heavily relied on by both the investors and legal 
practitioners.  
In addition to these specific foreign investment laws, there are also scattered 
provisions regarding foreign investment in other laws and regulations. For example, 
Article 22 of the Regulations on the Foreign Exchange System of the People’s Republic 
of China28 reads: “External borrowing in loans shall be undertaken in accordance with 
the relevant regulations by the government agencies designated by the State Council, 
financial institutions and other enterprises duly authorized by government agencies of the 
State Council in charge of exchange administration. 
External borrowing in loans by foreign-funded enterprises shall be filed with the 
exchange administration agencies for records.” 
The legal requirement on FIEs concerning external borrowing in loans is 
prescribed separately from domestic-invested enterprises. As a matter of fact, such dual 
legal requirements can be seen in many Chinese laws. 
c. Regional regulations 
According to the 1982 Constitution, the People’s Congress and their standing 
committees of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the 
central government can adopt local regulations governing foreign investment that do not 
contravene the Constitution, state laws and regulations. Besides, the provincial People’s 
Congress and their standing committees where the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) are 
located are authorized to make regulations for application within the SEZs only.29 These 
local regulations shall be filed with the Standing Committee of the NPC for record. They 
                                                 
28 Regulations on the Foreign Exchange System of the People’s Republic of China was issued by the PRC State Council 
with Ordinance No.193 in Jan. 29 1996, and later amended in Jan 14, 1997. 
29 Li Mei Qin, supra note 25, at p162 
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comprise the supplementary legal source to the state laws on foreign investment 
regulation in that specific region.  
Regional regulations played an important role in regulating foreign investment. 
Theoretically, regulations stipulated by the local governments shall be consistent with the 
national legislations. However, in practice, local regulations also supplement the national 
laws and regulations which are usually only general and broad principles. To some extent, 
they fill the legal vacuum left temporarily by the national legislations. The local company 
rules of Shenzhen SEZ and Shanghai, which were later superseded by the Company Law 
of the PRC in 1993, are such examples. Moreover, the Shenzhen local regulations on 
contracts between foreign and Chinese enterprises and those relating to foreign 
technology import contracts were predecessors of similar regulations of national level. 
The above three categories of laws comprise the majority of Chinese law on 
foreign investment. 
International treaties which China is a party are also the legal source for foreign 
investment, as China signed a substantial number of bilateral investment treaties as well 
as some multi-lateral treaties, such as the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States30.  
2. Investment vehicles 
Once China opened its doors to foreign investment in the 1980s after decades of 
isolation, foreign investors poured into China with enthusiasm, but their business 
concerns were simple and straightforward in comparison with today’s standards. In the 
                                                 
30 The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States was opened 
to signature on March 18, 1965 on behalf of all the States members of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. It entered into force on October 14, 1966, thirty days after the deposit with the Bank of the twentieth 
instrument of ratification. For its text, refer to the webpage: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc-archive/9.htm. 
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heady early days of foreign investment in China, most foreign investors interested in 
setting up a bridgehead were concerned primarily with choosing the right joint venture 
partner, obtaining hard currency to meet its business needs in China and repatriating 
profits to home countries. Other forms of business entities, such as holding companies or 
joint stock companies, simply did not exist then. Today, although certain restrictions still 
apply, the foreign investors are faced with far more choices in the type of business entity 
that they wish to establish and have more flexibility in designing an overall corporate 
structure for its business operations in China. Originally, there are only three basic 
investment vehicles for foreign investors to operate in China, namely, the EJV, the CJV 
and the WFOE. During the 1990s, foreign investors are gradually allowed to make 
investment in forms of joint stock companies and holding companies. And recently, 
foreign investors also attempted to enter the Chinese market through merger and 
acquisition (M&A) and venture capital investment.  
a. Sino-foreign equity joint venture 
EJV used to be the most popular form of FDI in China. According to the EJV law 
and its Implementing Rules, an EJV is required to incorporate into a limited liability 
company and is an independent economic entity with the status of “Chinese legal person”. 
An EJV is jointly financed by Chinese and foreign participants and the foreign party 
normally shall contribute at least 25% of the registered capital of the EJV. Chinese 
natural persons are not allowed to be parties to a joint venture. The parties of the venture 
jointly manage the company and share profits, risks and losses in proportion to their 
respective contributions of registered capital. Transfer of registered capital by one party 
is subject to the consent of the other parties and approval from the examination and 
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approval authority. In short, joint subscription of registered capital, joint management and 
joint sharing of profits and risks are the most distinct features of EJV. 
 An EJV used to have a limited operation term. In the EJV Implementing Rules of 
1983, the duration of an EJV agreement was specified as thirty years. In 1986, after an 
amendment to the Rules, the duration was prolonged to fifty years or more, depending on 
the amount of investment, construction period, profit rate, etc31. Now, unless the joint 
venture partners agreed otherwise concerning the operation term of the joint venture in 
the Articles of Association, the joint venture will enjoy unlimited operation term, except 
in certain industries32 where an agreement on operation term is mandatory33. 
            The legal framework for the EJV is the earliest as well as the most developed one 
among the three basic FIE laws. Therefore, regulations for the EJV often acted as model 
laws for subsequent legislations of other forms of FDI, and some EJV laws or regulations 
apply to the CJV and the WFOE by analogy. 
 b. Sino-foreign contractual joint venture 
 Contractual joint ventures, also known as cooperative joint ventures, are 
contractual arrangements whereby the Chinese and foreign parties cooperate in joint 
projects or activities according to the terms and conditions stipulated in their joint venture 
agreements34. The methods of cooperation and details of the terms and conditions are 
                                                 
31 See the Decision on the Amendment of Article 100 of EJV Implementing Rules, adopted by the State Council on 
Jan.15 1986. 
32 Namely, service industries such as hotel, entertainment, car rental etc., real estate development, resource exploration 
and restricted industries for foreign investment as listed in the Guidance Catalogue. See Article 3 of Sino-foreign 
Equity Joint Venture Operation Term Tentative Provisions, which was approved by the State Council on Sep.30 1990 
and issued by the MOFTEC on Oct.22 1990. 
33 See Article 2 of the Sino-foreign Equity Joint Venture Operation Term Tentative Provisions. For the Chinese text of 
the Provisions, see webpage: http://www.hd315.gov.cn/gcs/19qu/pinggu/flfg/law_hzjyqyhyqxzxgd.htm. Also see 
Article 6 of the Decision Concerning the Amendment of Sino-foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, adopted on the Third 
Meeting of the Seventh National People’s Congress on April 4, 1990. For the Chinese text of the Decision, see 
webpage: http://www.people.com.cn/zgrdxw/zlk/rd/7jie/newfiles/c1040.html. 
34 Jian Zhou, supra note 5, at p75 
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most left to the cooperative parties themselves to decide but just like an EJV, Chinese 
natural persons are not allowed to be CJV cooperative parties. The CJV law requires that 
a CJV agreement must spell out the conditions for cooperation, the distribution of profits 
and products, sharing of risks and losses, the management structure and the ownership of 
property at the time of termination of the joint venture.35
 Flexibility is the main advantage and characteristic of a CJV.  
A CJV could choose to register in different forms of enterprises: it could 
incorporate as a Limited Liability Company (LLC) and achieve the status of a “Chinese 
legal person” if it meets the corresponding legal requirements; it could also adopt a 
structure somewhat akin to a partnership 36  and register its contract with local 
Administrative Bureau for Industry and Commerce. In the latter case, since no legal 
person is created, the cooperative partners of the CJV are liable for the joint venture’s 
debt with all their personal properties. 
As to the management structure, unlike the EJV in which a Board of Directors is 
required to be established, a CJV could either set up a Board of Directors or a “joint 
managerial body” to decide major issues of the joint venture. And the management rights 
can be delegated to one of the parties, or even to a third party37. 
 Another feature is that the foreign investors of a CJV could recoup the invested 
principal during the early period of its operation. The condition is that the foreign 
investor should agree that all fixed assets of the CJV will be reverted to the Chinese party 
upon the termination of the joint venture. With respect to the capital contribution, in 
                                                 
35 See Article 2 of the Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law. 
36 See Pitman B. Potter, “Foreign Investment Law in the People’s Republic of China: Dilemmas of State Control”, 
China’s Legal Reforms, Oxford University Press, 1996, at p163 
37 Li Mei Qin, supra note 25, at p169 
 14
addition to cash and materials contributions, labor and services can also be treated as 
investment in a CJV. Since these investment need not to be assigned a monetary value to 
determine the equity percentage in registered capital, the parties save the time and costs 
of valuing the land, buildings, facilities, equipment and technologies, etc. provided by the 
parties.38 Accordingly, profits from the CJV may not necessarily be distributed in cash. 
Products may also be shared between parties and the proportion of sharing is not 
necessarily the same as their respective proportion of investment. 
 c. Wholly foreign owned enterprises 
 Wholly foreign owned enterprises are Chinese economic entities entirely owned 
by foreign investors. A WFOE is usually required to register as a limited liability 
company, but it may register as other forms by obtaining special approval39. Compared to 
the EJV and CJV, certain industrial sectors are closed to foreign investment in the form 
of a WFOE according to the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industry. 
Moreover, some of the preferential treatments for other FIEs are not available to the 
WFOE.  
The advantage of a WFOE is that without local partners, the foreign investors 
enjoy the independence and freedom to implement their own business strategies and the 
same corporate philosophy of the parent corporation. Therefore, it is a suitable vehicle for 
large transnational corporations. Another point is, many foreign investors with advanced 
technologies or trade secrets are seriously concerned with the poor intellectual property 
rights protection in China. A WFOE of independent management without local partners 
                                                 
38 Ibid 
39 See Article 18, Paragraph 1 of the WFOE Law Implementing Rules. 
 15
could greatly reduce the risks by limiting the releasing of technology or business know-
how of the investors40.  
 But to those foreign investors without previous business experiences in China, 
lack of a Chinese partner in the WFOE organizational structure can also be a great 
disadvantage, because the foreign investors may not have strong local personal 
connections or extensive personal networks, both of which are essential to business 
success in China. Surveys of businessman operating in China have shown that good 
personal connections help to improve their business. One good example is the Sincere Co. 
Ltd., which is a large Hong Kong-based retailer and established its presence in Shanghai 
early in 191441. It became the first foreign retailer to set up a joint venture department 
store in Shanghai. Its local partner is an enterprise controlled by the government of 
Shanghai Huangpu District. With the assistance of its powerful local partner and good 
personal networks in China, it became the first foreign retailer to commit to opening a 
department store in an inland province.42  
Another troublesome thing for WFOEs is that sometimes the foreign investor has 
to procure everything for the operation of the company by itself, especially the land and 
the building, while the foreign parties in an EJV or a CJV may have many of these 
necessities provided by their Chinese partners. 
 However, with the progress in the market-oriented reform in China, the WFOE 
gains increasing popularity among foreign investors in recently years. Foreign investors 
find more confidence now in doing business without a Chinese partner, as the legal 
                                                 
40 See Jian Zhou, supra note 5, at p77 
41 In 1914, Ma Yingbiao, an overseas Chinese businessman, established the Shanghai Sincere Co. Ltd as a branch of 
the Hong Kong Sincere Co. Ltd. The Shanghai Sincere Co. Ltd is the first large-scale department store in Shanghai. 
After the founding of the PRC, it was nationalized by the state and renamed the Shanghai Fashion Clothing Company 
in 1956. 
42 See Yan Wang, supra note 12, at p153 
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system become more transparent and the market economy more firmly established. 
According to a survey, in the early 1990s, the number of WFOEs accounted for about 20-
25% of all FDI investment projects and in 1998 the number of newly invested WFOEs 
almost equaled that of the EJVs during the same period.43
 d. Foreign-invested joint stock company 
 Although in 1993 the Company Law of PRC provided a legal framework for the 
establishment of joint stock company (also referred to as company limited by shares), it 
was still not clear then whether foreign investors could set up joint stock companies as 
promoters 44 . In January 10, 1995, the MOFTEC adopted the Provisional Rules for 
Certain Issues Regarding the Establishment of Foreign-Invested Joint Stock Companies 
which officially allowed the entry of foreign investment by this new investment vehicle. 
 The capital of a joint stock company is divided into equity shares of equal value. 
Shareholders bear liabilities according to the shares they purchased, and the debt of the 
company is secured by the company’s total assets. Similar to the EJV, at least 25% of the 
share of the joint stock company shall be held by foreign investors to qualify the 
company of FIE status. Compared to the other forms of FIEs, foreign-invested joint stock 
companies have higher entry threshold. The minimum registered capital of a foreign-
invested joint stock company shall be RMB30 million Yuan and the project must receive 
approval directly from the MOFTEC.  
Essential progresses have been achieved since the Chinese government opened 
the door of its domestic securities markets to foreign-invested joint stock companies. 
                                                 
43 Jian Zhou, supra note 5, at p79 
44 Before the passage of the Company Law, on May 15 of 1992 the State Reform Commission of the State Council 
issued a Regulatory Opinions on Joint Stock Company which explicitly excluded foreigners from promoters of a joint 
stock company. However, the Company Law only requires that more than half of the promoters of a joint stock 
company shall have residences in China, which might be interpreted as having allowed foreign investors to be 
promoters, though it was still not clear and lacked practicability at that time. 
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Now, foreign-invested joint stock companies may be allowed to list in domestic stock 
exchanges. Originally, when the Chinese stock market was established in the early 1990s, 
they were principally reserved to the State-owned enterprises (SOEs) to raise fund. Only 
a small portion of the quota for initial public offerings (IPO) was allocated to privately-
held Chinese businesses. And although there was no specific prohibition against FIEs to 
make IPOs in the Chinese stock market, there was no real channel for them to do so, 
because the listing rules were designed for domestic businesses. However, the new rules, 
the Notice of the General Office of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Concerning Issues Related to Foreign-Invested Joint Stock Companies (the 
“Notice”) which was issued on May 17 2001, permits foreign invested joint stock 
companies to submit applications for public listing to the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) upon obtaining the written consent from the MOFTEC.     
The Notice provides guidance on the procedures for listing a foreign-invested 
joint stock company in Chinese stock markets: When an existing foreign-invested joint 
stock company applies to list and issue A shares or B shares it must be officially 
approved by the MOFTEC and must meet the following requirements: 
(i) The foreign-invested joint stock companies must comply with foreign 
investment industrial policies when applying to list and after listing;  
(ii) The foreign-invested joint stock companies applying to list must be 
established in accordance with the Provisional Rules for Certain Issues Regarding the 
Establishment of Foreign-Invested Joint Stock Companies45;  
                                                 
45 A foreign invested LLC seeking to get listed must first convert its corporate form into a Joint Stock Company 
according to the Provisional Rules for Certain Issues Regarding the Establishment of Foreign-Invested Joint Stock 
Companies. 
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(iii) After the offering has been completed, the proportion of the unlisted shares 
owned by the foreign investors in the foreign-invested joint stock companies must not be 
less than 25%; 46
The Notice also permits foreign-invested joint stock companies to apply to list 
shares held by foreign investors as B shares.47
Later in November 8, 2001, the MOFTEC and the CSRC jointly issued The 
Several Opinions on Issues Related to Listed Companies that Involve Foreign Investment 
(the “Several Opinions”). The Several Opinions set out further conditions that a foreign-
invested joint stock limited company must meet in order to get approval for an initial 
public offering, including the revision that after the IPO the foreign-invested shares must 
comprise at least 10% of the total share capital. This 10% bottom line was reduced from 
the 25% minimal limit prescribed in the Notice, which lowers the threshold for the listing 
of foreign-invested joint stock companies and encourages more local control of the 
enterprise. However, it should be noted that dilution of foreign capital caused by listing 
may result in loss of FIE status. If a foreign-invested joint stock company’s foreign 
investment ratio drops below 25% of the total share capital after the IPO, it must return 
its foreign-invested enterprise approval certificate.48
The Several Opinions also provides that if a foreign-invested joint stock company 
whose shares include B-shares applies to have its unlisted foreign-invested shares 
converted into shares tradable in the B-share market, it must obtain consent from the 
MOFTEC. After obtaining consent, it must submit its application proposal for listing its 
                                                 
46 Briefed from the “Notice”. 
47 See Jun Wei and Stephen Curley, “Listing Rights Extended for Foreign Investment Enterprises”, China Law & 
Practice, July/August 2001, at p52 
48 Briefed from the “Several Opinions”. 
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unlisted foreign-invested shares and making them tradable to the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission. Conditions that must be met for such applications are listed out 
in the Several Opinions.49
Listing in Chinese securities market may provide an exit channel for foreign 
direct investment as well as a new means of financing for foreign invested joint stock 
companies within China. 
e. Foreign-invested holding companies 
Foreign-invested holding companies, also known as investment-oriented FIEs, 
refer to joint ventures or WFOEs that are permitted to make investment in other 
enterprises in China50. The major difference between a normal FIE and a foreign-invested 
holding company is their business scope: a foreign-invested holding company does not 
engage in any kind of production activities, instead, its main business is investment and 
related services for its invested enterprises.51  A China holding company is appropriate 
for certain large multinational corporations (MNCs) with substantial investments in 
China and a long range and comprehensive China business plan. The reason is that such 
long-term investors should consider the economies of scale and efficiencies that can be 
achieved through a corporate conglomerate structure involving a holding company that 
allows for more consolidation of management and control over all of the foreign 
investors’ FIEs in China.52 And accordingly, the entry requirement is high to set up a 
foreign invested holding company.  
                                                 
49 See Article 3 of The Several Opinions on Issues Related to Listed Companies That Involve Foreign Investment. 
50 Jian Zhou, supra note 5, at p81 
51 See webpage http://www.bizcn-sg.org.sg/tz&tzjn.htm. 
52 See Daniel C. K. Chow, A Primer on Foreign Investment Enterprises and Protection of Intellectual Property in China, 
Kluwer Law International, 2002, at p11 
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In retrospect, there were successively five major pieces of regulations governing 
foreign-invested holding companies. The earliest piece was the Establishment of 
Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign Investors Tentative Provisions, which 
was promulgated by the MOFTEC on April 4, 1995. It set forth the entry thresholds that 
eligible foreign investors of a foreign-invested holding company must have total assets of 
at least US$ 400 million in the year before it applies to establish the holding company. 
Besides, the investing company must have an aggregate paid-in registered capital in 
excess of US$ 10 million and shall have three or more approved investment projects in 
China. The high minimum capital requirement barred most foreign investors from 
establishing holding companies but it provided an appealing vehicle for large 
transnational corporations to manage their investment in China. 
The second and third regulations, the Establishment of Companies with an 
Investment Nature by Foreign Investors Tentative Provisions: Supplementary Provisions 
(1) and (2)53 (the Supplementary Provisions) relaxed some of the restrictions on the 
business scope of foreign-invested holding companies. Pursuant to the Supplementary 
Provisions, if the holding company has no record of illegality, its registered capital has 
been paid up on time, the amount of the registered capital actually paid up by the investor 
is not less than US$30 million, and such registered capital has already been invested into 
the invested enterprises, the holding companies could be allowed to: provide 
transportation and warehousing support to their invested enterprises; provide technical 
training to certain Chinese domestic enterprises beyond those in which they have a direct 
                                                 
53 The Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign Investors Tentative Provisions: 
Supplementary Provisions (1) and (2) were promulgated by the MOFTEC on August 24, 1999 and May 31, 2001 
respectively. 
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investment 54 ; purchase or integrate products of their invested enterprises and other 
enterprises for domestic and international distribution; engage in limited “market testing” 
by conducting trial sales of products imported from their parent companies; sponsor 
foreign-invested joint stock companies and hold non-listed shares of those companies.  
The fourth regulation in this line was the swansong of the MOFTEC before its 
merger with the State Economic and Trade Commission into the new Ministry of 
Commerce, the Amending the “Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature 
by Foreign Investors Tentative Provisions” and its Supplementary Provisions Decision55 
(the Amending Decision).  The Amending Decision continues MOFTEC’s step-by-step 
liberalization approach to holding companies and brings positive changes in at least five 
aspects. 
First, under the previous regulations, foreign investors of a holding company 
could only contribute the registered capital in free-convertible foreign currency. The 
Amending Decision, however, allows foreign investors to make capital contribution with 
RMB profits obtained in China or other RMB proceeds legally obtained from various 
activities including transfer of equity interests or liquidation. 56
Second, under the old Supplementary Provisions, where the registered capital of a 
holding company is not less than US$30 million, the amount of loans to be taken out the 
holding company cannot exceed four times the amount of its paid-up registered capital. 
The Amending Decision further stipulates that a holding company may take out up to six 
                                                 
54 The “certain Chinese domestic enterprises” refer to their product distributors and those entities with which it or its 
parent company has signed a technology transfer agreement, etc. 
55 The Amending the “Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign Investors Tentative 
Provisions” and its Supplementary Provisions Decision was promulgated by the MOFTEC on March 7, 2003. 
56 See Peter Corne, “MOFTEC’s Swansong: Easing Restrictions on PRC Holding Companies”, China Law & Practice, 
May 2003, at p17 
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times the amount of its paid-up registered capital in loans if the registered capital of 
holding company is not less than US$100 million.57
Third, the scope of investments that holding companies are permitted to make has 
been expanded. Under the old regulations, investments that can be made by holding 
companies were limited to areas of industry, agriculture, infrastructure and energy 
projects which were permitted or encouraged by the state. Now the scope has been 
extended to any area permitted by the state which includes service industries such as fund 
management or securities.58
Fourth, foreign-invested holding companies were generally unable to exercise 
most central treasury functions, including shifting funds from one affiliate to another, 
which becomes a major frustration to most holding company financial officers. Although 
the People’s Bank of China approved several fortunate holding companies to set up 
finance company subsidiaries, the thresholds for doing so is extremely high in general. 
However, it is reported that the MOFTEC and the central bank has discussed the 
possibility to lower such thresholds and permit holding companies to pool their RMB and 
foreign exchange with their invested enterprises. Experiments are currently being 
conducted in Shanghai. Taking these into account, the affirmation that holding companies 
could engage in foreign exchange balancing among invested enterprises may be 
significant in that it provides a basis for foreign exchange pooling to take place.59
Lastly, permitted business scope is further enlarged in the Amending Decision. 
Now, foreign-invested holding companies can establish a dedicated export procurement 
                                                 
57 See Article 5 of the Amending the “Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign Investors 
Tentative Provisions” and its Supplementary Provisions Decision 
58 See Peter Corne, supra note 56 
59 Ibid. 
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subsidiary; provide their invested enterprises with operational leasing services for 
machinery and office equipment, etc.60
On June 10, 2003, the above four regulations were combined into one piece, 
Provisions on the Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign 
Investors and replaced by the latter61. However, the new Provisions simply consolidated 
old regulations and did not bring new things to the area.  
It is hoped that through such further easing of government control, there will be a 
greater number of transnational companies preferring this vehicle and especially, willing 
to settle their regional headquarters in China in the form of holding companies.62
f. Merger and acquisition 
M&A is one of the latest means to make investment in China. However, it 
received incredible popularity among foreign investors in recent years. Investing in China 
through M&A has unique advantages. Firstly, somewhat similar to portfolio investment, 
foreign investors could play a passive role through acquisition, thus avoid significant 
investment of human resources or transfer of technology. Secondly, M&A may provide 
an ideal solution for the modernization and transformation of Chinese SOEs and therefore 
may obtain support from the Chinese government 63 . Through acquisition, foreign 
investors could inject the much-needed funds into the plaguing SOE.  
Although foreign acquisition of domestic enterprises has occurred for some years 
in China, they were largely conducted under a more or less workable but immature legal 
                                                 
60 See Article 8 of the Amending the “Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign Investors 
Tentative Provisions” and its Supplementary Provisions Decision. 
61 See Provisions on the Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign Investors. For Chinese text 
of the Provisions, see webpage: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=78120 
62 See Jun Wei and Stephen Curley, “Permitted Business Activities Expand for Foreign Investors”, China Law & 
Practice, July/August 2001, Vol.15, No.6, at p44 
63 As a matter of fact, the promulgation of Utilizing Foreign Capital to Re-organize State-owned Enterprises Tentative 
Provisions by the Chinese government in 2002 reflected its support to foreign M&A of SOEs. 
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and regulatory framework. Foreign acquisitions of non-listed domestic enterprises were 
addressed unsystematically, with FIE laws and state asset related regulations being the 
main bodies of legal source. Generally speaking, only if state-owned assets were involved 
in the acquisition did appraisal requirements apply, while acquisition of domestic 
enterprises by an FIE involving no state-owned assets was largely unregulated, provided 
such acquisitions didn’t entail any industry sector restrictions, then generally no approval 
requirements were needed at all.64
A specific rule on foreign acquisition of SOEs brought an end to such unregulated 
scene, as a practitioner described: “the party is over”65. In November 2002, the Utilizing 
Foreign Capital to Re-organize State-owned Enterprises Tentative Provisions66 became 
the first regulation directly address the issue. It applies to transformation of SOEs or 
companies with state-owned shares 67  into FIE form through foreign acquisition. 
According to the Tentative Provisions, as a general rule, foreign acquisition of SOEs or 
state-owned shares shall not impair national economic security and shall not result in 
monopoly in the market. Industry policy concerning foreign investment shall also be 
obeyed. 
On March 7, 2003 the MOFTEC promulgated the Merger and Acquisition of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors Tentative Provisions 68  (the “M&A 
Provisions”), which generally governs foreign M&A activities in China. The M&A 
Provisions does not apply to acquisition of FIEs by foreign investors. Two modes of 
                                                 
64 See Peter A. Neumann, “Private Acquisitions by Foreign Investors in China: Is the Party Finally Over?”, China Law 
& Practice, April 2003,Vol.17, No.3, at p13 
65 Ibid. 
66 For Chinese text of the regulation, see website: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=42130 
67 Excluding financial enterprises and listed companies. See Article 2 of Utilizing Foreign Capital to Re-organize 
State-owned Enterprises Tentative Provisions. 
68 For Chinese text of the regulation, see website: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=42949 
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M&A by foreign investors are permitted under the M&A Provisions: first, foreign 
investors could purchase the shares of non-FIE domestic enterprises or subscribe to the 
additional shares of non-FIE domestic enterprises during capital increase, and 
accordingly convert the form of the invested enterprises into FIE69; second, foreign 
investors could opt to set up an FIE first, and then purchase and operate domestic 
enterprises’ assets through the FIE, or otherwise, first purchase the assets of domestic 
enterprises, and then establish an FIE with the purchased assets and operate the assets 
through the FIE70. 
The Tentative Provisions also provide that foreign investment by ways of M&A is 
subject to the regulation of Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industry, 
which means that foreign investment through M&A will not result in the admission of 
foreign investment into the industries that are prohibited to foreign investors or foreign 
control in the industries that should be dominant by domestic capital. And previously, 
outside appraisals were only mandated in the case of acquisition involving state-owned 
assets. However, the M&A Provisions now impose an appraisal requirement on all 
acquisitions of domestic enterprises by foreign companies.71
One remarkable scene of foreign M&A in China is the modernization of China’s 
banking sector through foreign investment, which attracted much attention these days. 
The American-based Citibank bought 5% of the share of Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank and became a strategic shareholder in the bank72. More remarkably, the Newbridge 
Investment Group of U.S. acquired 15% of the share of the Shenzhen Development Bank 
                                                 
69 See Article 2 of the Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors Tentative Provisions, this 
kind of M&A is referred to as “M&A by purchase of shares” in the Tentative Provision. 
70 Ibid. This kind of M&A is referred to as “M&A by purchase of assets” in the Tentative Provision. 
71 See Peter A. Neumann, supra note64, at p14 
72 See the news article at the webpage: http://www.phoenixtv.com/home/finance/cjxw/200301/02/17709.html 
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and became the largest and controlling shareholder in the bank73. It is reported that 
Newbridge will introduce advanced management mode into the Shenzhen Development 
Bank and perfect the corporate governance of the bank. 
 g. Venture Capital in the form of “Limited Partnerships” 
 The economic power released by the ally of venture capitals and advanced 
technologies in the Silicon Valley and other parts of the world at the beginning of the 
new century impressed the Chinese government and influenced its encouragement 
policies toward foreign investment.74
In August 2001, China released the Establishment of Foreign-invested Venture 
Capital Investment Enterprises Tentative Provisions (the 2001 Provisions) to permit and 
encourage foreign investors to form China-based venture capital funds. However, the 
2001 Provisions imposed many non-market restrictions on the formation and operation of 
venture capital funds. Not strangely, it fell considerably short of the expectations of 
foreign investors and therefore did not create attractive vehicles for foreign investment.75 
On February 18, 2003, a set of new rules, entitled Administration of Foreign-invested 
Venture Capital Investment Enterprises Provisions (the 2003 Provisions) were published, 
which overcame many of the limitations of the prior provisions. 
The 2003 Provisions bring the structure and operations of foreign-invested 
venture capital investment enterprises (FIVCIE) much closer to the international norms. 
Although neither the 2001 Provisions nor the current 2003 Provisions speak in terms of 
limited partnerships, as a matter of fact, the new rules allows the establishment of 
                                                 
73 See the new article at the webpage: http://business.sohu.com/58/50/article203425058.shtml 
74 See “Venture Capitals in China”, at the website: http://www.vcchina.com/source/sj02.html 
75 See Jeff Wood and Richard Xu, “China’s Revised Venture Capital Rules: Limited Partnerships with Chinese 
Characteristics?”, March 2003, China Law & Practice, at p18 
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FIVCIE in the form that is functionally equivalent to a limited partnership. Article 4 of 
the 2003 Provisions stipulates that:  
“A FIVCIE may take the form of a non-legal person or the form of a company.  
Investors of a FIVCIE in the form of a non-legal person entity shall be jointly and 
severally liable for such FIVCIE’s debts. Alternatively, such investors may also agree in 
the contract of the FIVCIE that the requisite investor as provided under Article 7 will be 
jointly and severally liable for the FIVCIE’s debts where the assets of the FIVCIE are 
insufficient to discharge such debts while the liability of each other investor will be 
limited to the amount of its respective capital contribution subscribed for.”  
If the partners of the non-legal person FIVCIE shall be jointly and severally liable 
for the FIVCIE’s debts, such a non-legal person FIVCIE is actually a general partnership 
under the Chinese law (which can be registered in the form of “non-legal person CJV”)76. 
However, the “alternative” mentioned in the same provision that the partners other than 
requisite partners can be charged only with limited liabilities by joint venture contract can 
be found in anywhere else in Chinese laws. In essence, this is a limited partnership but 
regrettably there is still no nationwide limited partnership law in China. 
 The 2003 Provisions also contain the following new features: 
 (i). The 2003 Provisions clarify that a venture capital fund requires only one 
general partner and it reduced the general partners’ contribution requirement from 3% of 
the old rule to 1%. 
                                                 
76 As mentioned in former paragraphs, a CJV can choose to incorporate as a limited liability company or it can opt not 
to incorporate into a limited liability entity. In the latter case, it is actually organized as a general partnership. However, 
due the existence of the “Double Track System”, the Partnership Law of the PRC cannot be directly applied to the CJV. 
Therefore, although such an enterprise may satisfy the legal requirements as well as the characteristics of a general 
partnership, it cannot be called a “partnership” under the Chinese law. It is normally referred to as a “non-legal person 
CJV”. 
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 (ii). The 2003 Provisions provide total flexibility to call capital on an “as-needed” 
basis over an investment period that maybe as long as five years, and permit unused 
commitments to be released at the end of the investment period. 
 (iii). The 2003 Provisions recognize that a venture capital fund can be managed 
on day-to-day basis by a fund manager under independent contract which was not 
addressed in the 2001 Provision. 
 (iv). The only capital requirement for a limited partner under the 2003 Provisions 
is a capital contribution of at least US$1 million, while the 2001 Provisions required all 
foreign investors to commit at least US$10 million and to have one or more foreign 
investors who would contribute at least US$20 million to the venture capital fund.77
  
 
III. The “double track system” 
 1. Origin of the “double track system” 
As already mentioned, one of the most distinct features of Chinese foreign 
investment law is the corporate law oriented legislative approach, which means that the 
core of Chinese foreign investment laws is, actually, foreign invested enterprise laws 
(FIE laws). The FIE laws regulate issues like corporate establishment, registration and 
operation, etc. In nature, they should belong to the sphere of company law. But taking the 
reality of China during the early years of “Reform and Opening” into account, it could be 
much easier to understand.  
 At the beginning of the Reform, there was no corporate law in real sense in China. 
All the enterprises either belong to the state or collectively owned by the people. SOEs, 
                                                 
77 Briefed from the 2003 Provisions 
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much more like a part of the administrative organ, perform the economic plan of the 
government. So at that time there were virtually no proper vehicles for foreign investment. 
In order to make the entry of foreign investment possible, the Legislature enacted the 
EJV law even without constitutional acknowledgement of the legality of foreign 
investment which, ironically, belongs to the Capitalist society. The enactment of the EJV 
law reflects the positive aspect of system innovation as it facilitates the entry of foreign 
investment. But the adverse impact from a long-run perspective is that, to some extent, it 
established the later economic legislation mode: differentiation according to the type of 
ownership.  
Generally speaking, the PRC foreign investment law is separated from the legal 
regime for domestic-invested enterprises. Foreign investment law forms an independent 
system that co-exists with the laws solely or mainly applicable to the domestic-invested 
enterprises78. In other words, the two different groups of enterprises, domestic-invested 
enterprises and FIEs, are regulated by two sets of laws in China. The foreign investment 
law and the domestic investment law together constitute the Chinese investment legal 
rules. It is the so-called “double track system” in Chinese economic legislation.79
Table 1: A brief illustration of the “Double Track System”80
     Domestic Legislation81 Foreign Investment Legislation 
                                                 
78 See Table 1 below to get a rough picture of such differentiation. 
79 See Lu Jiongxing, “On the Perfection of Foreign Investment Legal System”, Chinese Legal Science, March 1996, at 
p71 
80  This table is used as an illustrative comparison only, not for statistical purposes. Also see Xiong Jining, “WTO and 
the Growing Chinese Corporate Law” (WTO Yu Sheng Cheng Zhong de Zhong Guo Gong Si Fa) , Journal of 
Economic Law (Jing Ji Fa Lun Cong), Vol. 3, at p431 
81 For the purpose of better illustration of the “double track system” in the Table, Chinese business laws are roughly 
classified into two groups: domestic and foreign investment legislations. However, as a matter of fact, such 
classification is not entirely precise, because as a result of the on-going market-oriented reform in China, today an 
increasing number of Chinese laws are applied to both domestic businesses and foreign investment.  But undeniably, 
specific legislation in foreign investment still exists and constitutes the major part of laws governing foreign investment 





1. Company Law of the PRC;  
2. Partnership Law of the PRC;  
3. Sole Proprietorship Enterprise Law of the 
PRC;  
4. Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
industrial Enterprise of Public Ownership 
1.EJV law, CJV law, WFOE law and their 
respective Implementing Rules; 
2. “The Notice of the General Office of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Concerning Issues Related to 




1. “Regulations of the People’s Republic of 
China on the Administration of Company 
Registration”;  
2. “Regulations of the People’s Republic of 
China for Controlling the Registration of 
Enterprises as Legal Persons”  
1. “Regulations on the Registration and 
Approval Procedures for Chinese-Foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures” 
2. “Tentative Regulations on the Standards 
of Submitting Registration Fees for Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures” 
Labor 1. Labor Law of the PRC; 
2. “Regulations of the PRC on the Settlement 
of Labor Disputes in Enterprises” 
1. “Provisions on Labor Management of 
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures”; 
2. “Provisions on Labor Management of 
Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises” 
Tax 1. Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC; 
2. “Provisional Regulations of the PRC on 
Enterprises Income Tax” 
1. Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic 
of China for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Enterprises 
Banking 1. Law of the People’s Bank of China; 
2. Commercial Bank Law of the PRC 
1. “The Regulations of the People's 
Republic of China on Administration of 
Foreign-Invested Financial Institutions” 
Insurance  1. Insurance Law of the PRC 2. “The Regulations of the People's 
Republic of China on Administration of 
Foreign-Invested Insurance Companies” 
Foreign 
Exchange 
1. “Regulation on the Foreign Exchange 
System of the PRC”; 
2. “Tentative Measures on the Foreign 
Exchange Regulation of Domestic 
Residents” 
1. “Rules for the Implementation of Foreign 
Exchange Regulations Relating to 
Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, 
Enterprises with Foreign Capital and 
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures” 
Securities 1. Securities Law of the PRC 2. “The Rules for the Establishment of 
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Securities Companies with Foreign Equity 
Participation”; 
 
 Separation of domestic and foreign investment law promoted the economic 
development and attracted foreign investment into China during the early days of the 
Reform. When China finally decided to adopt the “Open Door” policy in the late 1970s, 
the Chinese legal system was incomplete and seriously underdeveloped. Before 1966, 
there were only a few published laws, such as the Constitution and Marriage Law in 
China and laws in economic area were almost blank. More devastatingly, after the 
Culture Revolution started in 1966, even these established laws were mostly destroyed. 
That is to say, there existed no statutes regulating either foreign or domestic investment 
in those days.82 In order to support the “Reform and Open” policy, China adopted its first 
piece of foreign investment law — the EJV Law in 1979, which symbolized the 
commencement of the construction of Chinese foreign investment legal regime. But at 
that time, domestic-invested enterprises were still under the planned economy and subject 
to state plans and administrative orders, so there was no need for statutes regulating 
domestic-invested enterprises. Therefore it was impossible at that time to establish a legal 
framework applicable to both foreign and domestic investment. Formation of “double 
track system” has its historical reason. 
 
2. Unification try failed in the Company Law 
The promulgation of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China in 
1993 didn’t eliminate the trench between the two tracks, although it tried to clarify the 
                                                 
82 This means that at that time, application of domestic investment laws to foreign investors, like most developed states 
have done, is also not available to China.  
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relationship between the Company Law and the FIE laws in its Article 18. To some 
extent, the enactment of the Company Law was largely motivated by the inherent need of 
the modernization of SOEs, which was then strongly urged by the central government83. 
According to the Company Law, an SOE could convert into a wholly-state-owned 
company. 
Article 18 of the Company Law reads: “The law applies to limited liability 
companies with foreign investment. Where the laws on Sino-foreign equity joint ventures, 
Sino-foreign cooperative joint ventures and wholly-foreign-owned enterprises otherwise 
provide, the provisions of such laws apply.” Although there were some controversies 
concerning the interpretation of this clause, as some scholars thought this provision had 
in fact enabled foreign investors to choose the method of incorporation under either one 
of the three FIE laws or the Company Law, most scholars believe that the correct 
interpretation of the relationship between the Company Law and the FIE laws is that of 
general to special law. The legal implications of this relationship are three fold: First, 
where the Company Law is silent, the special provisions of the FIE laws should apply; 
Second, where the Company Law and FIE law conflicts, the latter prevails; Third, where 
the FIE laws are silent, the general principles of the Company Law apply.84  
But things can be more complicated in practice than in theory, especially when 
the third situation occurs. For example, according to the EJV Law, there is no minimum 
capital requirement for the establishment of joint ventures, which means that under the 
EJV Law, the registered capital of an EJV can be of any amount. However, the PRC 
                                                 
83 During the 14th General Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party in 1992, the former Chinese President and Party 
Leader Jiang Zemin officially called for the modernization of SOEs in his report. 
84  See Anyuan Yuan, “Perspective: Foreign Direct Investment in China- Practical Problems of Complying with 
China’s Company Law and Laws for Foreign-Invested Enterprises”, 20 NW. J. Int’l Law & Business, at p481 
 33
Company Law sets minimum capital requirement for LLCs. According to the Company 
Law, the registered capital of LLCs of production nature shall be no less than 
RMB500,000 Yuan; the registered capital of LLCs engaged in retail business shall be no 
less than RMB300,000 Yuan; and the registered capital of LLCs engaged in 
technological development,  consulting and services shall be at least RMB100,000 Yuan. 
Then the question is whether the FIEs should comply with the minimum capital 
requirement as set forth in the Company Law or not. 
Another case is that both the EJV Law Implementing Rules and the CJV Law 
Implementing Rules require the joint ventures issue investment certificates to the 
investors who have fully paid their subscribed registered capital. But there are no similar 
provisions in the WFOE laws. Thus in practice, many WFOEs do not issue investment 
certificates to their investors.85 However, the Company Law mandates that all LLCs shall 
issue investment certificates to their shareholders86.  In such circumstances, shall limited 
liability WFOEs issue investment certificates to their shareholders in accordance with the 
Company Law? 
If only based on the Article 18, we can simply draw the conclusion that the 
principles of the Company Law shall be applied in both situation as the FIE laws doesn’t 
address the particular issue while the Company Law does. However, the fact is that there 
are no such clear-cut answers to these questions, and a case-by-case study is necessary 
here. In practice, the solutions for the two problems are just in contrary. As to the 
minimum capital requirement, it is true that after the Company Law came into effect, 
FIEs are subject to the minimum requirement for registered capital of the Company Law. 
                                                 
85 A WFOE could be a sole-shareholder company in which there is only one investor. Non-issuing of investment 
certificate to the investor may be justifiable or understandable only under such circumstances. 
86 See Article 30 of the Company Law of the PRC. 
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Minimum registered capital requirements are set forth to ensure the general security of 
market operation and the interests of the public at large, therefore FIEs shall make no 
exception. But with respect to the investment certificate, the prevailing position is that a 
WFOE doesn’t have to issue investment certificate to its investors. The logic is: 
considering the express statutory requirements of issuing investment certificates to 
shareholders in the EJV and CJV Laws, the silence of the WFOE Law on this issue could 
be deemed as a tacit permission of a waiver of this obligation. Therefore, pursuant to the 
principle that foreign investment rules should prevail over the same provision of the 
Company Law, WFOEs do not need to issue investment certificates to the investors even 
after the Company Law has entered into effect. 
Indeed, the FIE laws had already developed into a relatively complete and self-
contained legal system long before the establishment of the Company Law. It operated 
without a general company law for many years, therefore, in reality, the Company Law 
and FIE laws still operate in parallel. The basic image of the “double track system” didn’t 
experience any significant change. 
 
IV. Disparities in the treatment for foreign and domestic businesses 
1. Discrepancies between the two “tracks”: a comparative study of the Company 
Law and the FIE laws 
 In many occasions, only because the capital sources are not the same, the 
Company Law and the FIE laws set out different legal requirements for domestic-
invested enterprises and FIEs on same issues. There are four major aspects of 
discrepancies between the Company Law and the FIE laws. 
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a. Requirements for registered capital 
Registered Capital is a mandatory requirement for the incorporation of a limited 
liability company under both the Company Law and the three major FIE laws. The 
shareholders are only liable for the company’s debt to the extent of their capital 
contributions in the registered capital of the company. But the Company Law and the FIE 
laws provide different legal requirements on registered capital. 
For a limited liability company incorporated under the Company Law, the 
registered capital must be actually and fully paid to the company before the State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce would issue the business certificate.  
In comparison, under the FIE laws, the registered capital means the amount of 
capital that the foreign investors (and with their Chinese partners in the case of an EJV or 
a CJV) agreed to contribute to the company. Compared to the Company Law, the 
contribution requirement on registered capital is more liberal in the FIE laws. For 
instance, according to the EJV law, the parties have six month to contribute their agreed 
capital contribution87, and may have an additional one month to do so after the six 
months period without substantially affecting their rights under the EJV contracts88. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to evaluate the different provisions in the Company Law 
and the FIE laws in terms of which one is more advanced, because such differences, 
usually, were caused by the different underlying legislative purposes of the respective 
laws. At the time of the passage of the Company Law, the Legislature felt imperative to 
check the somehow expanding practices of false capital contribution, so they chose to 
adopt the strict statutory capital system. While in order to attract the foreign investors, it 
                                                 
87 See Song Xixiang, “On the Influence of WTO Accession to the Foreign Investment Law of Our Country” (Lun Jia 
Ru WTO Dui Wo Guo Wai Zi Fa de Ying Xiang), Foreign Economics & Management, Vol.22, Jun.2000, at p2 
88 Anyuan Yuan, supra note 84 
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is deemed more important for the FIE laws to be compatible with the international 
practice, therefore the authorized capital system is preferred, as most western countries, 
such as the United States, do not require the “stated capital” to be actually paid by the 
shareholder to the corporation at the time of registration89. But after nearly ten years’ 
practice of the statutory capital system, the phenomenon of false capital contribution has 
been greatly reduced in China. And compared to the statutory capital system, the 
advantage of the authorized capital system is that it gives more flexibility to the investors 
and it is more efficient in the utilization of capital as it effectively reduces idling capitals. 
It is proposed by some Chinese scholars that the Company Law should adopt the 
authorized capital system in future amendments.90
b. Alteration of corporate capital 
Alteration of corporate capital can be further divided into two situations: 
reduction of registered capital and transfer of shares by shareholders. 
(i). Reduction of registered capital 
The Company Law allows a corporation (include both limited liability company 
and company limited by shares) to reduce its registered capital within its licensed term of 
operation. Article 39 and Article 46 of the Company law entitles the board of directors of 
an LLC to formulate plans for reduction of registered capital and make resolutions with a 
2/3 quorum of the board. Articles 103, 112 and 149 of the Company Law contain similar 
provisions for company limited by shares concerning the same issue. Additionally, 
Article 186 provides detailed procedures for reduction of registered capital.  
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 See Ding Zuoti, “A Tentative Research on the Relationship between Company Law and the FIE Laws” (Gong Si Fa 
Yu Wai Shang Tou Zi Qi Ye Fa Guan Xi Chu Tan), Jiang Hai Academic Journal (Jiang Hai Xue Kan), May 1997, at 
p75 
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Although in principle foreign invested enterprises are allowed to reduce their 
registered capital too, such reduction is subject to the approval of relevant governmental 
agencies and must be filed with relevant registration authorities. In fact, before the 
modification of the Implementing Rules of the EJV Law and the WFOE Law in 2001, 
reduction of registered capital is strictly not allowed for EJVs and WFOEs. Take the 
Implementing Rules of the EJV law as an example, before being modified in July 22 
2001, the original text of its Article 22 reads: “A joint venture shall not reduce its 
registered capital during the term of the joint venture”. The Implementing Rules of the 
WFOE law imposed similar restrictions.91 So the present stipulation has already been the 
results of a loosened regulatory policy. 
 Presumably, the strict requirements in the FIE laws would provide more security 
and protection to the creditors of the company92, but there is no evidence to prove that the 
credit of foreign invested enterprises is inferior to their domestic-invested counterparts. 
More importantly, in modern corporate practices, registered capital no longer necessarily 
indicates the credit situation of a company. Due to the loss in its operation, a company’s 
actual assets may be far below its registered capital. Thus, to a certain extent, registered 
capital has lost its function as a safeguard for the company’s creditors.93
(ii). Transfer of shares by shareholders 
Quite similar to the situation of reduction of registered capital, while both of the 
FIE laws and the Company Law allow the shareholders to transfer part or all of their 
                                                 
91 See Article 22 of WFOE Law Implementing Rules adopted on Oct. 28 1990 by the State Council (before it being 
amended in 2001). For the Chinese text of the regulation, see webpage: http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=52600 
92 See Zhang Xi, “On the Coordination of Foreign Investment Law and Company Law of PRC”, Journal of Yuxi 
Normal College of China, Vol. 17, 2001.5, at p50 
93 See Tang Jianhui, “On the Conflicts between Company Law and Foreign Invested Enterprises Law of China” (Gong 
Si Fa Yu Wai Shang Tou Zi Qi Ye Fa Mao Dun Tan Xi), Journal of Shandong Legal Science (Shan Dong Fa Xue), 
1998.5, at p13 
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shares to other shareholders or third parties, the FIE laws impose stricter requirements 
with respect to such transfer of shares compared to the Company Law. 
FIE laws generally require that transfer of shares must achieve unanimous 
consensus among all parties and governmental approval from relevant authorities. Take 
the EJV Law as an example. Article 20 of the EJV Law Implementing Rules stipulates: 
 “If one party to the joint venture intends to assign all or part of its investment 
subscribed to a third party, consent shall be obtained from the other party to the joint 
venture, and approval from the examining and approving authorities is required.  When 
one party assigns all or part of its investment to a third party, the other party has 
preemptive right. 
No assignment shall be effective should there be any violation of the above 
stipulations.” 94That means if one party objects to such transfer, then according to the law 
the transfer should fail. 95
Shareholders’ unanimous consensus and governmental approval are not required 
by the Company Law concerning transfer of shares. Its Article 35 reads: 
 “Shareholders may transfer among themselves all or part of their capital 
contributions. 
Where a shareholder transfers its capital contribution to a person other than a 
shareholder, the consent of more than half of all shareholders shall be required. A 
shareholder objecting to such transfer shall purchase the capital contribution to be 
transferred and such shareholder shall be deemed as agreed to the transfer if he does not 
purchase the capital contribution.” 
                                                 
94 See Article 20 of the EJV Implementing Rules. For the Chinese text of the regulation, see webpage: http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=15589 
95 Anyuan Yuan, supra note 84 
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Barriers to the transfer of shares in FIE laws caused much difficulty in practice. 
There were many instances that the cooperative relationship between the Chinese and the 
foreign party had already broken up, but as the Chinese party wanted to retain the FIE 
status to enjoy the preferential tax treatment, it insistently refused the foreign party’s 
proposal to transfer shares. This defect in the law created many cases of impasse in the 
actual operation of FIEs.96
Some basic knowledge about Chinese government’s approach to foreign 
investment might help to explain why harsher requirements are imposed on FIEs.  
Although China needs foreign capital and technology, at the same time it is concerned 
with the potential negative effects of foreign investment, such as distortion of national 
economy, contamination of traditional culture as well as environment pollution, etc. One 
result of the debate once happened within the government over how to use foreign 
investment is that foreign investment could be beneficial to China, if such investment 
were carefully harnessed to China’s economic development. Therefore, for China there is 
a dilemma of regulating conduct against national interest yet not discouraging foreign 
investment. So the aim of legal control is not to discourage foreign investment, but to 
supervise and ensure that the investment is geared to the economic goals of the state and 
potential harmful effects are filtered.97 Probably, one common concern of the Legislature 
at the time of adoption of the FIE regulations was that foreign investors may falsely 
contribute to the company just in order to acquire the FIE status to enjoy the preferential 
                                                 
96 See Du Weiyi, “On the Reconstruction and Innovation of Chinese Foreign Invested Enterprises Law”, International 
Economic and Trade Research, No.3 2000, at p50. 
97 See Yan Wang, supra note 12, at p70 
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tax treatment exclusively reserved to FIEs98, therefore special requirements were imposed 
to restrict and regulate the exit of foreign investment once it entered into China. This 
reason may justify the restrictions on the reduction of registered capital and transfer of 
shares in FIE laws. But establishment of a registration system (e.g. filing with relevant 
governmental agencies upon reduction of registered capital and transfer of shares) would 
be enough to check the practice of false capital contribution, as when the foreign equity 
in an FIE falls below 25%, such change in the nature of the company can be noticed in 
such filing process and preferential tax treatment can accordingly be terminated 99 . 
Decisions concerning reduction or transfer of investment should be made by the foreign 
investors themselves based on their commercial considerations and should not be subject 
to the governmental scrutiny. Anyway, the lack of a free exit channel for foreign 
investment would inevitably increase the apprehension of foreign investors and therefore 
might have adverse influence on the encouragement of foreign investment. 
c. Governance structure100
The corporate governance structure of an LLC incorporated under the Company 
Law is far different from that of the LLC incorporated under FIE laws, especially the EJV 
Law and the CJV Law. Generally, the governance structure of an LLC under the 
Company Law is a triple level model: the shareholders’ meeting, the Board of Directors 
(Board of Supervisors) and the Manager. At shareholder’s meetings, all shareholders 
represent themselves as the owner of the company, and accordingly, they are entitled to 
                                                 
98 See Dai Shengyi, “Some Problems with the Chinese Foreign Invested Enterprises Law and its Perfection” (Wo Guo 
Wai Shang Tou Zi Qi Ye Fa de You Guan Wen Ti Ji Qi Wan Shan), Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and 
Economics, No.3 1999, at p78 
99 See Liu Zhiyun & Yuan Kai, “On the Unification of Domestic Investment and Foreign Investment Corporate 
Organization Law” (Chu Yi Nei Wai Zi Qi Ye Zu Zhi Fa de Tong Yi Wen Ti), Modern Legal Science (Dang Dai Fa 
Xue), No.6 2001, at p 33 
100 Some CJVs may adopt the non-legal person form of enterprises, like partnerships, instead of incorporating as LLC. 
Such CJVs will not be discussed in this section, because there is no point to compare the governance structure of LLC 
with partnership. 
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vote in proportion to their capital contributions during every meeting and decide the most 
important issues of the company. The Board of Directors is the executive organ of the 
company, with all of the directors appointed by and responsible to the shareholders’ 
meeting. The Manager, in turn, is appointed by and reporting to the Board, and handles 
all the daily operations of the company. In comparison, under the EJV Law and the CJV 
Law, the governance model of an LLC is a dual level structure: only Board of Directors 
and the General Manager. Since there is no shareholders’ meeting, the Board of Directors 
actually takes the role of both shareholders’ meeting and itself. According to the EJV 
Law and the CJV Law, the directors are appointed by the joint venture partners “in 
reference” to the proportion of their capital contributions and the directors shall be loyal 
to the company as well as their appointing partners. Like the Manager in an LLC 
incorporated under the Company Law, the General Manager is in charge of the daily 
operations of the company. 
Theoretically speaking, as the Company Law was published fourteen years later 
than the first FIE law——the EJV law, its provisions on corporate governance structure 
should be more advanced and reasonable than that of the latter, at least, it had better 
chance to reflect the developments in the legal practice in corporate governance and the 
needs of the society. However, it was not necessarily the case. Problems in separation of 
ownership and management exist in both the FIE laws and the Company Law. 
As mentioned, one distinct difference between companies incorporated under the 
Company Law and FIEs in corporate structure is that the board of directors is the highest 
authority in an FIE and there is no requirement to set up a shareholders’ meeting, while 
the shareholders’ meeting is a must for a company incorporated under the Company Law 
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and it also performs as the highest authority for the company. Besides the shareholders’ 
meeting, an LLC incorporated under the Company Law is required to set up a board of 
supervisors (or a sole supervisor in the case of a small-scaled LLC) and a board of 
directors. Understandably, the aim of the Company Law is to set up a check-and-balance 
system among the three corporate organs. The problem is that the shareholders’ meeting 
is vested with too much power concerning the operation of the company. According to 
the Company Law, the shareholders’ meeting is granted the power to decide the 
company’s investment plan and approve the company’s budget and profit distribution. 
Besides, the shareholders’ meeting makes resolutions with regard to the increase and 
reduction of the company’s registered capital, the issuance of corporate bonds, the 
amendments of Articles of Association, and also the merger, division and dissolution of 
the company. These powers and functions are generally performed by the board of 
directors in an FIE. 
Separation of ownership and management is the common practice in the area of 
corporate governance. The reason is that shareholders, who are usually outside the 
centralized management of the company, do not necessarily possess the expertise and 
familiarity with the company’s business to fulfill their responsibilities. This is particularly 
true when the company is a large-scaled LLC or a listing company. Actually, in the 
United States, the shareholders may only vote on resolutions already passed by the board 
of directors.101
As to the FIE laws, the situation is more intriguing. In many cases, the joint 
venture partners serve as Directors themselves. Moreover, as is often happens, Director 
may also be appointed as the General Manager, which in the end may be the partners 
                                                 
101 Anyuan Yuan, supra note 84 
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themselves. Thus, similarly, the company owners are not separated from the management 
board. This would cause the problem of “dual loyalty” and may impair the smooth 
operation of the company. 
d. Establishment of sole-shareholder LLC 
The attitude towards sole-shareholder LLC is dramatically diverted in Company 
Law and the FIE laws. Under the Company Law, only SOE could convert into a sole-
shareholder LLC, and all the other domestic economic organizations and individuals are 
not allowed to set up such sole-shareholder LLCs102. But according to the WFOE law and 
its Implementing Rules, foreign enterprises and individuals are entitled to set up FIEs in 
the form of a sole-shareholder LLC. 
It is possible that the existence of sole-shareholder LLCs may result in the abuse 
of corporate personality and limited liability, especially in a country lacking the tradition 
of rule of law like China. But this problem can be solved by setting up counterbalancing 
legal mechanisms, like the principle of “piercing the corporate veil” in the United States 
to protect the company’s creditors and other parties with interests in the company. The 
point is the discrimination against the domestic investors and privately owned enterprises 
impairs the spirit of equal competition and fairness of a market economy.103
 
2. Preferential treatment to foreign investments 
 It is true that FIEs receive less favorable treatment in some areas compared to 
the domestic-invested enterprises, such as the scope of market access. But this is only one 
                                                 
102 See Article 20 of the Company Law of PRC 
103 Liu Zhiyun & Yuan Kai, supra note 99, at p34 
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side of the coin. On the other side, FIEs are entitled to extensive preferential treatment 
and incentives that are not available to their domestic-invested counterparts.  
 Generally speaking, preferential treatment to the foreign investors includes two 
categories: national incentives and region-specific incentives. 
 a. National incentives 
 In order to further meliorate the investment climate in China, the State Council 
adopted the Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment (the 
Encouragement Provisions) in October 11, 1986. Unlike the early incentives provided in 
the old foreign investment tax laws, namely, the Income Tax Law for Sino-foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures and the Income Tax Law for Foreign Enterprises which were granted on 
the basis of the form of the investment, the incentives in the Encouragement Provisions 
are granted irrespective of the form of the venture and its location104.  The new tax law on 
foreign investment reflects the legislative spirit of the Encouragement Provisions. The 
NPC enacted a unified Income Tax Law of the PRC for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Enterprises in 1991 to replace the previous two tax laws on 
equity joint venture and foreign enterprises respectively. 
 The new foreign investment tax law applies to all “enterprises with foreign 
investment” and “foreign enterprises”105. As to the tax rate, all the enterprises mentioned 
above, which are engaged in production and business operations, will be levied at a 
unified rate of 33%106. And more importantly, all FIEs that are production-oriented with 
                                                 
104 See Article 19 of the Encouragement Provisions. For Chinese and English text of the regulation, see webpage: 
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=3910 
105 See Article 1 and 2 of the Income Tax Law of the PRC for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign 
Enterprises. For Chinese and English text of the law, see webpage: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=7536 
106 See Article 5 of the Income Tax Law of the PRC for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises. 
Nevertheless, FIEs established in the Special Economic Zones and other specially designated areas receive more 
preferential tax rate, which will be addressed in the next section. 
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operation periods of ten years or more are entitled to enjoy tax exemptions for the first 
two years and 50% tax reductions for the subsequent three years. This “two-year 
exemption and three year 50% reduction” rule is the basic tax holiday scheme provided 
for foreign investors. 
 The Encouragement Provisions also provided other kinds of benefits to FIEs. 
These benefits include: permission to adjust their foreign exchange surpluses and 
deficiencies among each other; exemption from the Industrial and Commercial 
Consolidated Tax on most export products; the privilege to export their products directly, 
which is not available to most domestic-invested companies unless they obtain special 
permission from government authorities; exemption from the requirements to apply for 
import licenses for machinery parts or raw materials needed to fulfill export contracts. 
 Moreover, the Encouragement Provisions demands the local authorities and 
relevant departments in charge to simplify bureaucratic procedures and ensure foreign 
investors of management autonomy such as the right to determine production and 
operation plans, the freedom to employ and dismiss staff, and the right to decide its wage 
and bonus systems.107
 In addition to the incentives that are applicable to all kinds of FIEs, FIEs that 
are either export-oriented or technologically advanced are eligible for additional 
privileges 108 , which include: exemption from payment of all state subsidies that 
enterprises normally shall pay to workers and staff; reduced land-use fees or totally 
                                                 
107 Considering the adoption time of the Encouragement Provisions, the year 1986, when the liberalization in the area 
of planned economy still lagged behind, such treatments can be a great privilege enjoyed by the foreign investors. 
108 The reason is that these FIEs meet the Chinese government’s objective of earning foreign exchange and obtaining 
advanced technology. 
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exemption; priority in obtaining water, electricity and transportation services; priority in 
receiving loans for short-term revolving funds and other needed credit from banks.109
 b. Region-specific incentives 
  SEZs are the earliest outcome of the open-door policy, which were established 
for the purpose of attracting foreign capital, technology and expertise.110 One advantage 
to the foreign investors is that, within the SEZs, they will be offered with tax reductions, 
trade opportunities, low land and utilities costs as well as abundant labor resources with 
low wages. Another privilege of SEZs is that provincial governments where the SEZs are 
located could enact local regulations to reduce bureaucratic “red tapes” and simplify 
lengthy approval procedures, which could not be found in other parts of China in early 
days due to the policy restrictions by the central government. 
 SEZs are originally designed as experimental laboratories for economic reforms. 
With less control and intervention from the centrally-planned economic system which 
ruled the rest parts of China those days, SEZs had the opportunity to develop first by 
experimenting with the market economy. This experiment is supposed to be limited 
within the SEZs in the beginning, but can be spread to the whole nation if proved to be 
successful. As special privileges to the enterprises established in the SEZs, they are not 
subject to the state plans regarding purchase of supplies for producing products of export 
nature and they are permitted to set sale prices in accordance with international market 
conditions. Furthermore, the SEZs led the steps in the opening of market to foreign 
investors. SEZs were the first to permit the establishment of foreign bank branches in 
China and in 1985 foreign financial institutions were allowed to engage in RMB dealing 
                                                 
109 See Yan Wang, supra note12, at p129 
110 There are totally five SEZs in China. Four of them, namely Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen, were 
established in 1979 and 1980. And later in 1988 the whole of Hainan Island became the fifth SEZ. 
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and services in SEZs, which was not permitted even in Shanghai before 1990. The SEZs 
were also first to allow foreign investment in real estate development, retailing, and some 
other service industries. 
 Following the SEZs, fourteen costal cities were designated as “Open Costal Port 
Cities” (OCPCs) in mid-1984.111 The location of these cities reflects that the original 
purpose of setting up these OCPCs was revitalizing existing industrial regions with 
similar incentives to the SEZs. However, local governments of these cities are granted 
more autonomy to approve foreign investment projects.112
 Each Open Costal Port City was further permitted to set up Economic and 
Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) as sub-zones within its region, in which the 
local government could offer incentives to foreign investors rivaling those available in 
the SEZs. According to the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, which was adopted at the 
Fourth Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 9, 1991, enterprises 
with foreign investment of a production nature in ETDZs shall be levied at a reduced rate 
of 15%.113 And additionally, foreign investors can have access to better infrastructure and 
utilities conditions such as water and electricity supply in the ETDZs, as these zones are 
developed specifically to support and encourage foreign investment in industrial sectors 
and suit the needs of foreign investors.  
                                                 
111 The fourteen cities are: Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Shanghai, Nantong, Ningbo, 
Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Beihai and Zhanjiang. But later the OCPC gradually lost its geographic significance 
and the preferential treatment for OCPCs had also been applied to some inland cities, such as Ying Kou during the 
1990s. 
112 See Yan Wang, supra note12, at p126 
113 Normally, FIEs are levied at a 33% rate of its taxable income. See Article 5 of the Income Tax Law of the People’s 
Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises. 
 48
 In the late 1980s, five larger areas, namely, the Liaodong Peninsular, the 
Shandong Peninsular, the Yangtze Delta, the Pearl River Delta and the Xiamen-
Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle Region, were designated as Open Costal Economic Zones 
(OCEZs). In 1988, the Ministry of Finance promulgated the Tentative Provisions 
concerning the Reduction and Exemption of Income Tax and Industrial and Commercial 
Consolidated Tax for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment in the Open Costal 
Economic Zones, in which the Ministry listed out the cities and counties designated as 
“open” to foreign investors.114 As to the tax rate, the income tax on enterprises with 
foreign investment of a production nature established in OCEZs shall be levied at the 
reduced rate of 24%. The income tax on enterprises with foreign investment in OCEZs 
within the scope of energy, communications, harbor, wharf or other projects encouraged 
by the State, may be levied at the reduced rate of 15%.115
High or New Technology Industrial Development Zones (HNTIDZs) were 
introduced to offer additional incentives to enterprises which have been identified as 
technology intensive according to the standards formulated by the State Science and 
Technology Commission. Compared to the ETDZs, the HNTIDZs are more specialized 
in that they aim at attracting hi-tech industries. Pursuant to the Rules for the 
Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for Enterprises 
with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, enterprises with foreign investment 
recognized as high or new technology enterprises established in the State HNTIDZs 
designated by the State Council shall be imposed of enterprise income tax at the reduced 
                                                 
114 As a matter of fact, not all the cities and counties in the five OCEZs are open to foreign investment. Only those 
listed in the Appendix to the Tentative Provisions are accessible by foreign capitals. 




 On April 18, 1990, the State Council declared that it would open the Pudong New 
Area to foreign investment with preferential treatment and autonomy equivalent to those 
of the SEZs. The development of Pudong is aimed at re-establishing Shanghai as an 
international financial center and generating resources for the economic development of 
the whole country. One feature of the Pudong New Area is that several sub-zones of 
different functions are created within the Area, which includes the Lujiazui financial area, 
Zhangjiang HNTIDZ as well as a free trade zone, the Waigaoqiao Bonded Zone. FIEs 
located in the Pudong New Area can also enjoy extremely competitive low tax rates. 
According to the same Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the 
People’s Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign 
Enterprises, production-oriented FIEs established in the Pudong New Area of Shanghai, 
as well as FIEs engaged in energy resource and transport construction projects such as 
airports, ports, railways, highways and power stations will be taxed at the reduced rate of 
15%.117
 As a matter of fact, local governments sometimes offer much more generous 
terms in order to attract foreign investment into their own regions. For example, Hefei 
Municipality of Anhui Province passed a local regulation requiring that the local 
government examination and approval authority must give an official response to the 
“establishment application” of foreign investors within seven days after submission118. 
Compared to the ninety-day examination and approval period under the national 
                                                 
116 See Article 73, Para. 5 of the Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 
for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises. 
117 See Article 73, Para. 4 of the Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 
for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises. 
118 Jian Zhou, supra note 5, at p137 
 50
legislation, this is a great convenience for foreign investors. Moreover, the Hefei local 
regulation extends the 50% income tax deduction to hi-tech FIEs from three years in the 
national legislation119 to a six-year period. Local extension of tax incentives can be found 
in many other regional regulations, and some of them are even in violation of national 
laws and policies. Actually, at a time when the amount of foreign investment attracted 
has become an indication of economic achievements and feats of the local officials, 
excessive and undue competition among regions is unavoidable and it often led to the 
loss of tax revenues and detriment to the national interests. 
 A latest trend in the area is that, in an apparent effort to utilize foreign 
investment to boost the development of poverty-stricken Central and Western China, 
preferential policies have been introduced to investment in the targeted regions. For 
example, the State Administration of Taxation decided on December 17, 1999 that after 
the existing preferential tax policies expired, enterprise income tax would be levied at a 
reduced rate of 15% for another three years for FIEs under the “encouraged category” 
established in Central and Western China. Also, in a Circular Concerning Tax 
Preferential Policies for Developing the Western China dated December 30, 2001, the 
General Administration of Customs announced that equipment imported by FIEs in the 
“encouraged category” established in Central and Western regions could be exempted 
from customs duties and value-added tax.120  
 c. Negative effects of preferential policy 
                                                 
119 See Paragraph 8, Article 75 of the Rules for the Implementation of Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of 
China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises 
120 See Kong Qingjiang, “Towards WTO Compliances: China’s Foreign Investment Regime in Transition”, The 
Journal of World Investment, Vol.3, No.5, October 2002, at p876 
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 Some observers pointed out that there were at least three adverse effects caused 
by the application of preferential treatment and tax incentives to foreign investment: first, 
public revenue decreased, as the key of the preferential treatment policy is to sacrifice a 
part of government tax revenue to attract foreign investment. Second, preferential tax 
treatment placed FIEs at a very advantageous position in market competition and it 
consequently weakened the competitiveness of local enterprises. Actually, an increasing 
number of domestic investors had already complained that preferential treatment to 
foreign investment represented reverse discrimination measures that left domestic 
companies at a competitive disadvantage with their foreign competitors; a survey of a 
number of Chinese entrepreneurs indicate that 74.2% of them believe that their 
enterprises receive unfair treatment compared to FIEs in market competition121. Finally, 
the legislative privileges of the SEZs and some other costal provinces enabled them to 
stipulate more favorable policies and incentives to attract foreign investment, thus most 
foreign investment flowed into these areas and this brought imbalance to regional 
development and new types of social injustices122. Researches revealed that by the end of 
1994, the number of foreign invested projects utilized by the Central and Western China 
was 36,056 and constituted only16.7% of the national figure; and the actual sum of 
foreign capital utilized was US$ 8.4 billion, only 8.79% of the national figure.123
 Besides, because of the disparity in tax treatment between FIEs and domestic-
invested enterprises, many Chinese domestic enterprises go around the law through a 
process called “round-tripping” in order to be treated as foreign investors. In other words, 
                                                 
121 See Zhu Chongshi and Zhao Junrong, “On the Principle of National Treatment and Perfection of Chinese Foreign 
Investment Law”, Financial Research, 1995.07, at p25 
122 See Bao Ximei, “Some Problems in the Chinese FIE Laws” (Wai Shang Tou Zi Qi Ye Fa Zhong de Ji Ge Wen Ti), 
Oriental Forum (Dong Fang Lun Tan), No.2, 2001, at p 63; also see Gu Mingkang, supra note 14, at p451 
123 See Zhong Jiling, “Foreign Investment Policy and Perfection of Foreign Investment Legislation” (Wai Zi Zheng Ce 
Yu Wai Zi Li Fa de Wan Shan), Modern Law Science (Xian Dai Fa Xue), 1996. 4, at p107 
 52
application of preferential tax treatment to the FIEs had resulted in many cases of “fake 
foreign investment” in China. In order to enjoy the lower tax rate and tax reduction under 
the preferential tax scheme to the foreign investors, a lot of Chinese enterprises make 
investment in China through subsidiaries registered in other countries, particularly some 
offshore financial centers, like the Virgin Islands or Bermuda, and meanwhile, some 
Chinese individuals changed their nationalities to qualify as foreign investors.124  Round-
tripping is a kind of “system escape”, whereby Chinese investors successfully tried to 
avoid the regulatory regime governing domestic investment by channeling capital 
through foreign subsidiary and thereby brought the capital under a more favorable regime 
that governs foreign investment. One estimate suggested that round-tripping inward FDI 
accounted for 25% of China’s FDI inflow in 1992.125 Taking this into account, the figures 
of FDI attracted to China need to be reassessed in light of fake foreign investment. 
 In the long run, over-reliance on preferential tax treatment to attract foreign 
investment can only leads to the distortion of a level playing field of the marketplace. 
And such preferential treatment and tax incentives may also constitute direct or indirect 
government subsidy measures thus be prohibited by the WTO agreements.126
 
V. Practical Problems in the operation of FIEs: A case study 
 In this part, several real cases will be discussed to illustrate the practical 
difficulties in the operations of FIEs in China. Defects in the laws can be understood 
through analyzing these cases. 
                                                 
124 See Shang Qingfeng and Xu Weihua, “Principle of National Treatment and Reconstruction of Chinese Foreign 
Investment Law”, Journal of University of Petroleum, China (Edition of Social Sciences), Vol.17 No.6, at p79 
125 See Yan Wang, supra note12, at p130 
126 See Chen Xiangcong, “On the Reconstruction of Chinese Foreign Investment Under the WTO System”, The Journal 
of Fujian Institute of Political Science and Law, Aug. 2000, at p18 
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1. Registered capital and corporate assets 
a. Must the ownership of non-monetary contribution be transferred from the 
investors to the joint venture? 
 One common kind of disputes arose out of the transfer of the ownership of non-
monetary contribution from the investors to the joint ventures. 
 Case 1: A Hong Kong company signed a joint venture contract with two 
Mainland Chinese companies to establish a limited liability CJV for producing packaging. 
Pursuant to the contract, the Hong Kong Company contributed US$800,000 to the joint 
venture. One of the Chinese companies contributed US$200,000 and the other offered the 
building, machines and equipment as its contribution. Later, a dispute arose in the 
operation of the joint venture. Having failed to settle the dispute through negotiation, the 
parties applied for arbitration. Through investigation procedures, the arbitral panel found 
that although one of the Chinese parties delivered the building, machines and other 
equipment to the joint venture for its use, it didn’t go through the necessary procedures to 
transfer the title of these material assets to the joint venture. Thus, the arbitration panel 
ruled that the Chinese company could not be regarded as having fulfilled its obligation of 
capital contribution.127
Case 2: A U.S. company and a Chinese company signed a joint venture contract 
for establishing a limited liability CJV. In accordance with the contract, the U.S. 
Company contributed an amount of U.S. dollars in cash to the joint venture, and the 
Chinese company provided land-use right and warehouses as its contribution. Afterwards, 
a dispute occurred between the two parties over the implementation of the joint venture 
                                                 
127 The cases is cited from Yao Xiaoming, “Legal Issues Notable by Chinese, Foreign Investors in Making Investment 
with Contribution in Kind, Industrial Property Rights, Technological Know-how or Land-use Right”, China Law, 
August, 2000, at p32 
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contract. The two parties applied to an arbitration commission for an arbitral award. After 
its investigation and review of the case, the arbitration commission held that although the 
Chinese company delivered the relevant land-use right and warehouse to the joint venture 
for its use, it did not go through the formalities for re-registering with relevant 
government agencies and changing the title of the property. Accordingly, the arbitration 
commission ruled that the Chinese company failed to fulfill its obligation of making 
investment.128
 The situations in the two cases are quite similar. According to the two cases, 
although the investors delivered workshop buildings, machines, equipment and land-use 
rights to the CJV at its disposal, it didn’t necessarily mean that they had fulfilled their 
obligation to make capital contribution. In addition to the delivery of the non-monetary 
contribution to the joint venture, the investors must go through the formalities to transfer 
the title or the right to the use of the property to the CJV129. Only after the ownership or 
the right to the use of the property has been transferred to the joint venture, can they be 
legally regarded as having fulfilled their obligation. This should be a very simple legal 
principle, as after the investors make their contribution to the company, such contribution 
becomes the asset of the company, therefore no longer belongs to the original investors. 
However, the fact is, similar disputes are not rare in China presently. This may be 
because Chinese foreign investment law does not have perfect provisions on the 
formalities for transferring ownership or right to the use of property concerning capital 
contribution made with material assets or intangible rights. 
                                                 
128 Ibid. 
129 This only applies to the CJVs in LLC forms. Non-legal person CJVs are akin to partnerships, in which the investors 
jointly own the property of the partnership after they contribute their investment to the partnership. However, most 
CJVs adopt the LLC form in China and non-legal person CJVs only account for a very small proportion. 
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 The three major FIE laws, namely, the EJV Law, the CJV Law and the WFOE 
Law, do not provide for the transfer of the ownership of non-monetary investment. The 
major legal sources governing this issue are some ministerial regulations and rules issued 
by competent authorities. 
 One of the earlier pieces of such regulations is the Notice on Financial Issues 
Concerning Chinese Investment in Sino-foreign Equity and Contractual Joint Venture 
Enterprises (the “Notice on Financial Issues”) which was issued by the Ministry of 
Finance on Nov. 18, 1991. According to Article 5, Paragraph 2 of the Notice on Financial 
Issues, after the incorporation of an EJV or a CJV, the Chinese investor shall contact 
competent authorities of finance to go through the procedures of declaring the transfer of 
ownership or the right to the use of property that is contributed by the Chinese investor as 
investment in the joint venture and this will serve as evidence of Chinese investment 
during auditing by Chinese Certified Public Accountants130. It further provides that the 
procedures that shall be gone through by the Chinese investors for declaration cover fixed 
assets (such as houses, equipment, etc.), projects under construction, current assets 
(including raw materials and products), intangible assets, and land-use right. The problem 
is, for the transfer of land-use right as well as the ownership of properties like buildings, 
projects under construction, industrial property and technological know-how, mere 
submission of a declaration form to the finance department of the government shall not 
be deemed as enough. For example, according to the domestic laws and regulations on 
the administration of land, transfer of land-use rights shall be registered with relevant 
land administrative authorities.131
                                                 
130 For Chinese text of the regulation, see webpage: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=53862 
131 See Yao Xiaoming, supra note127, at p33 
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 On Dec. 18, 1995, the SAIC promulgated the Temporary Regulations on the 
Registration and Management of Registered Capital of Companies (the Temporary 
Regulations). 132  As the Temporary Regulations applied to both domestic-invested 
companies and FIEs133, it laid down specific provisions concerning the transfer of the 
ownership or the right to the use of property contributed as non-monetary investment to 
the FIEs. Article 12 of the Temporary Regulations provides that, where land-use right is 
contributed as investment, the companies concerned shall complete the formalities for 
renewing the registration of the right to the use of the land within six months from the 
date of incorporation. Here, the problem of conflict of laws arises again. According to the 
Regulations on Investment by All Parties Concerned in Sino-foreign Equity Joint Venture 
Enterprises promulgated by the MOFTEC and the Notice on Issues Concerning the 
Strengthening of Management of Review, Approval and Registration of Projects of 
Foreign-funded Enterprises promulgated by the SAIC, which are the two major legal 
instruments on the regulation of investment issues of FIEs, where the registered capital of 
the proposed FIE exceeds US$500,000, it can be paid up within one year from the date of 
incorporation, and where the registered capital of the proposed FIE exceeds US$ 10 
million, it can be paid up within a period as long as three years. Then the question is: 
which law shall be applied concerning the time limit for non-monetary contribution? As 
aforementioned, the “authorized capital system” in the FIE laws gives foreign investors 
ample time to fulfill their contribution obligations, while under the strict “statutory 
capital system” of the Company Law, investors of domestic businesses must fully 
                                                 
132 For Chinese text of the regulation, see webpage: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=12022 
133 Article 25 of the Temporary Regulations reads “This set of regulations shall be applicable to the management of 
registration of registered capital of foreign-funded enterprises, except for circumstances otherwise stipulated by law or 
administrative regulations.” 
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contribute their respective equity at the time of incorporation. Therefore, if the 
Temporary Regulations applies, it would actually deprive the foreign investors of some 
of their privileges endowed by the FIE laws. Taking the “special law” nature of the two 
FIE regulations (as against the “general law” nature of the Temporary Regulations) into 
account, the Regulations on Investment by All Parties Concerned in Sino-foreign Equity 
Joint Venture Enterprises and the Notice on Issues Concerning the Strengthening of 
Management of Review, Approval and Registration of Projects of Foreign-funded 
Enterprises shall be applied on this point. As a matter of fact, legislation by government 
authorities of different tiers and departments always leads to overlaps or conflicts in 
Chinese foreign investment law. 
b. Shall “cooperative conditions” be counted into the registered capital? 
The above discussed situation is that in the practice of limited liability CJVs, the 
ownership of non-monetary contribution has not really been transferred to the joint 
venture thus disputes arise later. But even if the ownership has been transferred to the 
joint venture in due course, certain problems remain unsettled. Under the EJV Law, non-
monetary investment in an EJV, such as contribution in kind, industrial property rights, 
business know-how or land-use rights must be evaluated and assigned a monetary value, 
no matter through third-party appraisal or mutual agreement between joint venture 
partners134. In comparison, the provisions in the CJV laws concerning investment are 
much more flexible. Article 17 of the CJV Law Implementing Rules allows the 
cooperative parties of a CJV to make investment with “cooperative conditions” which 
                                                 
134 See Article 25 of the EJV Law Implementing Rules, which stipulates: “Each joint venture may invest in cash or may 
contribute buildings, factory premises, equipment or other materials, industrial property, proprietary technology, or 
right to the use of a site, appraised at appropriate prices, as investment. If the investment is in the form of buildings, 
premises, equipment or other materials, industrial property or proprietary technology, the prices shall be determined 
through consultation by the parties to the joint venture on the basis of fairness and reasonableness, or they shall be 
evaluated by a third party accepted and invited by the parties to the joint venture”. 
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need not to be evaluated135. The concept of “cooperative conditions” was raised for the 
first time in Chinese law. According to Article 18 of the CJV Law Implementing Rules, 
cooperative conditions can be material assets or intangible property rights such as 
intellectual property rights or land-use rights, and they can be made in equal terms as 
monetary investment into CJVs. Usually, the cooperative conditions are provided by the 
Chinese parties in the CJVs and such investment structure are especially popular in 
industries like entertainment, real estate and restaurant.136 It is true that investment made 
in the form of “cooperative conditions” can greatly save the investors of the time, 
troublesome and sometimes the difficulties in evaluating the non-monetary investments. 
But at the same time, such flexible legal arrangements caused a lot of disputes in practice.  
The problem is: as cooperative conditions need not to be evaluated and assigned a 
monetary value, it is inconvenient to count it into the registered capital of the joint 
venture. Therefore, in some cases, the cooperative parties of a CJV may exclude the 
cooperative conditions and only register their cash contributions with the relevant 
government authorities as registered capital of the joint venture. 
Case 1: This case was a joint venture dispute heard by the Shenzhen Branch of the 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (the CIETAC)137. The 
foreign party (the appellant) and the Chinese party (the appellee) signed a cooperative 
joint venture contract to develop a commercial residential condominium together. 
According to the contract, the Chinese party should provide the right to the use of a piece 
                                                 
135 See Zeng Huaqun, Introduction to International Investment Law (Guo Ji Tou Zi Fa Gai Lun), Xiamen University 
Press, 1995.6, at p209 
136 See Chen Zhidong, “An Analysis of Several Legal Issues in the Corporate System of Chinese FIEs”, Journal of 
International Economic Law, Vol.1, Law Press, 1998.5, at p160 
137 The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (hereinafter referred to CIETAC) is a 
permanent international commercial arbitration institution established in April 1956, and which independently and 
impartially resolves, by means of arbitration, contractual or non contractual, economic and trade disputes. For more 
information, see its official website: http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/e_index.htm. 
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of land of 30,000M2 as cooperative conditions, the foreign party should provide the 
building cost of the project of RMB420 million Yuan and the joint venture would adopt 
LLC form. The two parties agreed that the registered capital of the CJV would be the 
RMB420 million Yuan cash provided by the foreign party. Later, due to a dispute over 
the settlement of construction fees, the appellant submitted the dispute for arbitration to 
the CIETAC, Shenzhen Branch. The appellant argued that because the registered capital 
of the CJV, the RMB420 million Yuan, was contributed wholly by the appellant, and the 
construction cost of the project was afforded by its investment in the form of registered 
capital, so the registered capital should not be deemed as the common property of the 
joint venture.138  
Such arguments may sound ridiculous, because in the above case, even if the land 
use right offered by the Chinese party as cooperative conditions was not counted into the 
registered capital of the company, the Chinese party had already fulfilled its obligation to 
provide cooperative conditions in due course and shall be deemed as a lawful shareholder 
of the joint venture. Therefore, the Chinese party shall undisputedly own stakes in the 
registered capital of the joint venture as well as in the finished condominium project. As a 
matter of fact, the agreement between the cooperative parties concerning the registered 
capital of the joint venture could be misleading itself. It gave people a wrong impression 
as if the registered capital was completely contributed by the foreign party and the 
Chinese party who provides the land-use right didn’t contribute anything to the joint 
venture. Today, transfer of land-use right has been a common and frequent practice in 
China and it has long been acknowledged that the land-use right has intrinsic monetary 
value. The purpose of the agreement between the CJV partners that such land-use rights 
                                                 
138 See Chen Zhidong, supra note 136, at p160 
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can be invested as cooperative conditions and needn’t to be evaluated is to expediate the 
establishment of the joint venture. It definitely doesn’t mean that such land-use rights are 
valueless. Non-monetary cooperative conditions shall have a proportionate relationship to 
the monetary investment in the CJV. It is on the basis of such a proportionate relationship 
that the cooperative parties make arrangements concerning share of profits and losses, 
allocation of risks and management powers among the parties.139
However, an abnormal fact in China, which creditors of a CJV can rarely reclaim 
their credit by land use right when other assets of the company are insufficient to repay 
its debt, may add some supports to such arguments. In standard LLCs, after the land use 
rights have been invested into the LLC, they become the property of the company, 
therefore during liquidation of the company they shall be used to pay the company’s debt. 
But in reality, efforts of the creditors to realize their credit by taking over the land use 
right of the CJV were always defeated. The following case is one of such examples: 
Case 2:  In a CJV contract the investors agreed that the Chinese party would 
provide land use right as cooperative conditions to the joint venture and the foreign party 
would contribute cash and other assets amount to US$800,000 in total, and the joint 
venture would adopt LLC form. The registered capital of the joint venture would be 
US$800,000, and the foreign party would take charge of the management of the company. 
After the establishment of the joint venture, the foreign party used fake invoices as 
evidence for its contribution in kind and fraudulently achieved the capital contribution 
inspection report from an accounting firm. Then, the foreign party applied for bank loans 
to several financial institutions in Shanghai in the name of the joint venture and procured 
RMB15 million Yuan. Soon afterwards, the Chinese party discovered the false 
                                                 
139 Ibid. 
 61
contribution acts of the foreign party, and applied to the CIETEC, Shanghai Branch for 
arbitration seeking termination of the joint venture agreement. The arbitration panel 
found in favor of the Chinese party in its verdict and terminated the joint venture 
agreement accordingly. In parallel with the arbitration process, the several banks also 
sued the joint venture in court for repayment of bank loans in order to protect their 
respective creditors’ rights. Their claims included that in case the joint venture failed to 
repay the loans, it should compensate the creditors with the land use rights owned by the 
company. However, such claims were rejected by the court, even though in the end the 
other assets of the joint venture were not enough to repay all its loans. 140  If the 
cooperative conditions are treated as the assets of the joint venture, during liquidation of 
the company, they shall be use for repayment of the company’s debt without exception. 
So if the judgment of the court could stand, the only logical explanation is that the 
cooperative conditions are not deemed as the property of the joint venture, accordingly 
the Chinese party didn’t contribute any asset to the joint venture, which is, obviously, an 
absurd answer.  
Then naturally, people would ask: what on earth is the nature of “cooperative 
conditions”? As we know, the most essential characteristic of an LLC is that the 
shareholders are responsible for the debts and obligations of the company only to the 
extent of their capital contributions. Of course, in Chinese CJV law, “cooperative 
conditions” is a separate and different concept from “capital contribution”. But if the 
cooperative conditions are not even regarded as the property of the joint venture, then the 
cooperative party that only provides cooperative conditions to the CJV actually takes no 
                                                 
140 Ibid. at p163 
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responsibility to the joint venture’s debts and obligations, like what had happened in Case 
2.  
The problem roots in the conflicts between the flexible arrangements provided by 
the CJV laws and the intrinsic requirements of a standard LLC. Land use right can be 
invested into a CJV without evaluation and could be excluded from the registered capital 
of the joint venture. To some extent, such arrangements are too liberal and flexible to 
accord with the standard of an LLC. Flexibility is desired, while limited liability is also 
desired, there is a vivid Chinese saying fits such situation: “Fish and bear palm cannot be 
acquired at the same time”141. The best solution, probably, is to sacrifice such flexibility 
for a set of clear and unified company law rules. 
2. Distribution of Profits in the CJVs 
CJV’s particularity in its ways of capital contribution determines its profit 
distribution mode. A standard LLC incorporated under the Company Law or an EJV 
incorporated under the EJV Law distribute profits to its shareholders in exact proportion 
to the percentage of each shareholder’s contribution in the registered capital of the 
company. However, the profit distribution mode established by the CJV laws is different 
from that laid down by the Company Law and the EJV Law. Article 43 and 44 of the 
CJV Law Implementing Rules provide detailed rules for the distribution of profit among 
cooperative parties. A basic principle is that the cooperative parties can design the mode 
of profit distribution through agreement.  
The “bottom line profit” clause is a commonly seen but problematic agreement in 
many CJV contracts. According to the company law theories, distribution of profit to the 
                                                 
141 Fish and bear palm are both delicious food and in this saying stands for “desirable things”, so the meaning of this 
saying is that it is usually impossible for a man to obtain all his desired things at the same time, something must be 
abandoned.  
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shareholders shall be the responsibility of the company, and if the company fails to fulfill 
this obligation in line with the stipulations in its Articles of Association, the shareholders 
could sue the company for specific performance or for damages. However, in the 
practical operation of CJVs in China, a common phenomenon is that only one of the 
cooperative parties actually takes part in the daily management of the joint venture.142 
And the other parties that do not take part in the management of the joint venture usually 
only ask for a fixed annual profit. As a result, in many CJV contracts, the cooperative 
parties reach agreement that the CJV shall pay a certain amount of money as “bottom line 
profit” to the non-managing party, and after such payments, the rest of the profit would 
all belong to the party in charge of the management of the joint venture. The problem in 
such arrangements is that disputes persistently arise between cooperative parties when the 
managing party fails to pay the bottom line profit to the non-managing party according to 
the terms of the joint venture contract while the joint venture also declines to do so. 
Usually, the non-managing party insists that non-payment of the fixed profit constitute a 
breach of the joint venture contract on the part of the managing party. But the managing 
party can argue that according to the terms of the contract, the responsibility to distribute 
profits lies in the joint venture, not the cooperative parties.  
It is true that, according to the joint venture agreement between the parties upon 
incorporation of the CJV, the joint venture, instead of the managing party, shall be 
responsible for the payment of the fixed annual profit to the non-managing party. That is 
to say, if the non-managing party doesn’t receive the agreed amount of fixed profit from 
the joint venture, the joint venture shall take the responsibility to compensate the 
damaged non-managing party. However, the non-managing party might encounter legal 
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obstacles if it tries to resolve the dispute through lawsuit or arbitration. As we know, the 
first thing the grieved party should do before bringing the case to court or an arbitration 
panel is to specify the cause of action. Here, the potential plaintiff would face a dilemma: 
whether to sue in breach of contract or tort.  
On one hand, if the non-managing party tries to sue the joint venture in breach of 
contract, it can only base its claims on the joint venture agreement 143 . However, 
according to the contract law theory, a contract can only set obligations for the 
contracting parties, but can’t impose obligations on third parties unless such third parities 
expressly agree to. Obviously, it is impossible that the joint venture could agree to 
assume the responsibility as it doesn’t even come into existence at the time of the 
conclusion of the joint venture agreement. Since the joint venture agreement is the basic 
legal instrument for the establishment of the joint venture, it is of course binding on the 
joint venture partners. But such binding effects cannot extend to the joint venture which 
is an independent legal person after establishment and which is not a party of the joint 
venture agreement. Therefore, claims based on breach of contract might not stand in such 
cases. 
One the other hand, if the damaged party chooses to sue in tort, then it can only 
resort to the judicial settlement of the dispute instead of arbitration as there is no 
arbitration agreement between the damaged party and the joint venture.  
 A real case will be introduced here to illustrate how Chinese courts deal with such 
disputes: 
                                                 
143 As there is no direct contract between the non-managing party and the joint venture concerning the obligation of 
profit distribution on the part of the joint venture, the joint venture contract becomes the sole legal document contains 
such contents. 
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 The plaintiff, the Shanghai Light Industry Corp. established a CJV named 
Shanghai Jin Ri Du Food Co. Ltd. (the defendant in the case) in cooperation with a HK 
company. In the joint venture agreement, the Shanghai Light Industry Corp. and the HK 
company agreed that the Shanghai party would provide the land and utilities, including 
water, electricity and gas etc. as cooperative conditions to the joint venture, and the HK 
party would be in charge of the management of the joint venture. The agreement also 
contained provisions stipulated that the CJV should pay 135 million Chinese Yuan to the 
Shanghai party as service fees144.But in its operation, the joint venture failed to pay the 
fees to the Shanghai party in due time. Therefore, the Shanghai party brought the dispute 
to the Shanghai Intermediate People’s Court against the joint venture. The defendant 
demurred at the jurisdiction of the court. It argued that there was no contractual 
relationship between the Shanghai party and the joint venture therefore this case is 
actually a contractual dispute between the cooperative parties; as there was a valid 
arbitration clause in the joint venture agreement, the dispute shall be resolved by ways of 
arbitration instead of judicial means. However, the court ruled in its order that: “the 
plaintiff and its HK partner set out the obligations for the defendant (the joint venture) in 
their joint venture agreement. After its establishment, the defendant never objected to 
these obligations, and therefore it shall be assumed that the defendant had agreed to take 
on the obligations. While there is no arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, the court shall have jurisdiction over the case.”145
                                                 
144 The so-called “service fees” is actually annual dividends in nature. As mentioned above, the land and utilities are 
provided to the joint venture as investments of the Chinese party. After the establishment of the joint venture, these 
investments has already become the asset of the joint venture, so there is no reason that the joint venture shall still pay 
any kind of service fees to the Chinese party.  
145 According to the “Hu Zhong Chu Jing Zi” No.545 Civil Order, by the Intermediate People’s Court of Shanghai 
Municipality, 1994. See Chen Zhidong, supra note 136, at p166-167 
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An in-depth reason for the occurrence of this kind of disputes is that the legal 
structure of a CJV cannot meet the standard of an LLC. As we know, compared to a 
standard LLC whose shareholders are associated by “capital”, the partners in a 
partnership have more personal connections between each other and are accordingly 
linked by “relationship” instead of “capital”. The CJV actually has more elements of a 
partnership rather than an LLC. The rights and obligations of the CJV cooperative parties 
are mainly stipulated by the joint venture agreement which is somewhat similar to a 
partnership contract, instead of the company law rules. Under such circumstances, to 
entitle the CJV of LLC status can only give birth to a freak. This explanation is also 
applicable to the difficulties occurred in the registered capital and corporate asset of CJVs 
discussed above. What makes things worse is that these problems cannot be resolved 
within the framework of FIE laws itself.  
 3. Corporate governance issues in FIEs 
 As mentioned in the former chapter, one of the distinct differences in corporate 
governance structure between LLCs incorporated under the Company Law and those 
under the FIE laws is that while the shareholders’ meeting is a mandatory organ as well 
as the highest authority in a standard LLC, there is no such requirements in FIE laws and 
the board of directors acts as the highest authorities for FIEs. Moreover, in FIEs the 
number of directors assigned by each shareholder is not necessarily in proportion to their 
equity percentage in the joint venture. The investors can decide the number of directors 
they are entitled to nominate through negotiations among the parties.146 However, during 
board meetings, the voting right of each director is still equal. Such a legal arrangement 
could cause the problem that majority shareholders may lose preponderance in the board. 
                                                 
146 See Article 35 of the EJV Law Implementing Rules and Article 25 of the CJV Law Implementing Rules. 
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As we know, the intrinsic nature of modern companies is the association of capital, and 
naturally the rights and powers of each shareholder shall be determined by its shares in 
the company. Majority shareholders undertake more risks therefore they shall have more 
say in the company. The shareholders’ meeting is the ultimate forum where the majority 
shareholders can exert their power and gear the company according to their will. But the 
governance structure of FIEs conflicts with such basic corporate governance rules, and 
because of this, sometimes cases of “adverse infringement” (minority shareholders 
infringe the interests of majority shareholder) can happen. 
 The “Bi Chun Water” dispute is one of such typical cases. In 1992, the Hong 
Kong Zhongtian International Co. Ltd. (the “Zhongtian”), the Shanghai Yanzhong 
Industry Joint Stock Company (the “Yanzhong”) and the Second Jiading Jianbang 
Industry Co. Ltd. (the “Jianbang”) established a joint venture producing purified drinking 
water in the brand name of “Bi Chun”. The equity percentage of the three parties was 
60%, 30% and 10% respectively. The board of directors comprised of 6 directors, three 
of which were nominated by Zhongtian, two by Yanzhong and the other by Jianbang. 
Besides, the chairman of the board was assigned by Yanzhong. It is clear here that the 
majority shareholder, Zhongtian, whose investment accounted for 60% of the registered 
capital of the company, only occupied half of the board positions. The joint venture 
achieved excellent performance soon after its establishment. In 1995 it occupied 43% of 
the market share of purified drinking water in Shanghai. In 1996, the net profit of the 
joint venture reached 10 million Chinese Yuan. Seeing the market success of the Bi Chun 
water, Yanzhong established two wholly-owned subsidiaries: one called the New 
Yanzhong Beverages Co. Ltd (the “New Yanzhong”) in the Shanghai Minhang District 
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producing “Yanzhong” purified drinking water in direct competition with the Bi Chun 
water, and the other called the Shanghai Bi Chun Trade Development Co. Ltd. (the 
Bichun Company) in Huangpu District. The chairman of the two companies was Mr. 
Wang Jian, the vice General Manager of Yanzhong, who also took the position of 
chairman of the joint venture at that time. Using his special status and power in the joint 
venture, Wang Jian authorized the Bichun Company in charge of the marketing and sales 
of both the Bi Chun Water and the Yanzhong Water. Numerous consumers were misled 
by the similar logos, packaging and ads of the two different products. Thus the profit of 
the joint venture slipped considerably. 
 The three directors assigned by Zhongtian requested the chairman Wang Jian to 
convene a board meeting to discuss the infringement matter several times in 1996. But 
Wang Jian refused to convene board meetings, utilizing a defect in the EJV Law 
Implementing Rules and the Company Law 147 . More outrageously, when the joint 
venture brought a lawsuit against the Bichun Company and the New Yanzhong, Wang 
Jian retrieved the Litigation Pleadings from the court, claiming that as the legal 
representative of the joint venture, all lawsuits of the joint venture must be represented by 
him and he had not yet approved the suit148. Finally, Zhongtian had to sue the Bichun 
Company, the New Yanzhong and the Yanzhong in derivative action which was not 
supported by any Chinese laws then. Fortunately, the court heard the case and under the 
                                                 
147 Article 48 of the Company Law stipulates: “The meetings of the board of directors shall be convened and presided 
over by the chairman of the board. If the chairman of the board is unable to perform his/her duty due to special reasons, 
a vice-chairman of the board or a director designated by the chairman shall convene and preside over the meeting. A 
board meeting may be convened upon the motion by at least one third of the directors.” Article 32 of the EJV Law 
Implementing Rules contains similar provisions. According to these two articles, to convene board meetings is the 
power rather than obligation of the chairman of the board. And whether to convene board meetings upon the request of 
other directors is at the discretion of the chairman, so the chairman has the right to reject such motions. 
148 According to the EJV Law Implementing Rules Article 34 and the CJV Law Implementing Rules Article 31, the 
chairman of the board is the joint venture’s legal representative. Under Chinese law, the legal representative is the 
natural person whose acts bind the joint venture. Only the legal representative’s signature officially binds the joint 
venture, and signatures by other directors of the company or by a quorum of directors, are all legally ineffective.  
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mediation of the panel, the parties reached a settlement agreement at last. The three 
defendants agreed to make apologies for infringement acts, retrieving infringing products 
from the market, compensate RMB1.7 million Yuan to the plaintiff and terminate all 
infringing activities from then on.149
 Though the result of the case was satisfactory, the cause of such cases worth 
careful consideration. Admittedly, the Company Law also contains the procedural defects 
concerning the convening of boarding meetings, but at least in LLCs incorporated under 
the Company Law, the majority shareholders can protect their interests against possible 
threatening from the management board through shareholders’ meetings. It should be 
noted that FIE regulatory framework was established and developed in the absence of a 
general company code, and after a relatively standard Company Law has been enacted, 
some of the FIE law provisions obviously lag behind the Company Law and the defects 
in the FIE legal framework become more and more evident.  
 
VI. Summarize: Defects in the current foreign investment legal framework  
In summary, the following defects can be perceived in the Chinese foreign 
investment law: 
 First, due to the multi-level and over-lapping legislation in the foreign investment 
area, Chinese foreign investment laws and regulations are heavily fragmented. 
Consequently, conflicts and discrepancies are a commonplace within such a legal 
framework. For example, Article 6 of the EJV Law stipulates that the Chairman and 
Vice-chairman of the board of director shall be assigned by the joint venture parties 
thought negotiations or elected by the board of directors. This provision enables the joint 
                                                 
149 See Chen Zhidong, supra note 136, at p169-170 
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venture partners to decide the chairman and vice-chairman of the board by party 
autonomy, or otherwise by democratic elections of the board of directors. However, 
before amendment in 2001, Article 34 of the EJV Law Implementing Rules stipulated 
that “the chairman of the board shall be appointed by the Chinese parties, and the vice-
chairman of the board by the foreign parties.” Such provisions obviously conflicted with 
the EJV Law, but as a matter of fact, this conflict existed for more than 17 years150! 
 Second, the existence of the “double track system” hampers the further market-
oriented reform in China. The incorporation of market economy into China experienced 
four stages: “centrally-planned economy”151 — “market economy as a complement to the 
centrally-planned economy”152 — “planned market economy”153 — “socialist market 
economy”154. The gradual liberalization of the economic policy of the central government 
determines the tentative legislative approach in the area of foreign investment legislation. 
So in the early days of the Reform, when the centrally-planned economy prevailed, the 
existence of such a “double track system” is forgivable, as in a planned economy, the 
duties and obligations of different economic entities were prescribed differently in law, 
therefore it was virtually impossible for them to be treated in the same manner155. State 
enterprises have to undertake onerous obligations such as carrying out state economic 
plans, providing public services, taking life-long care of their staff, and finally handing 
over the profits to the state, thus in return, they enjoy the privileges in material supplies, 
                                                 
150 The EJV Implementing Rules was first issued in 1983, and the said stipulation was abolished in the amendment in 
2001. So it existed for 17 years plus! 
151 See the 1978 Constitution, Article 11 
152 See the 1982 Constitution, Article 15 
153 See “Marching Along the Road of Chinese-Characterized Socialism”, the Communiqué of the Thirteenth General 
Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party held in October, 1987 
154 See “Accelerating the ‘Reform and Opening’ and Steps of Modernization, Achieving Great Success in the Cause of 
Chinese-Characterized Socialism”, the Communiqué of the Fourteenth General Meeting of the Chinese Communist 
Party held in October, 1992 
155 See Guan Jiatao, “Reconstruction of Foreign Investment Law and Modification of Preferential Tax Policy to the 
Foreign Capital”, International Economic Cooperation, 1999 No.3, at p 41 
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bank loans and state subsidies, etc.156 None of these special rights can be enjoyed by the 
FIEs as they don’t have to take the responsibilities of the SOEs. But with the gradual 
prevalence of the market economy after 1993, “double track system” has become a major 
hindrance to the ongoing economic reform day by day. 
 Lastly, some of the stipulations of the current foreign investment law are outdated 
and could no longer adapt to the changed legal environment as well as the actual needs of 
the society, thus need to be abolished or replaced by new laws157. The legislative design 
of the corporate structure of CJV is one of such typical instances. As analyzed in the 
former chapter, the structure and legal arrangements for CJVs were laid down at a time 
when there was no standard company law in China. After the legal framework for 
standard LLCs had been erected by the Company Law, the arrangements provided by the 
CJV Law could not be fitted into the structure of an LLC under the Company Law. As a 
result, currently there are several types of LLCs existing in China which is rarely seen in 
other countries.  
 In all, the current framework of Chinese foreign investment law - the basic image 
of “double track system”- stemmed from an old economic and legal institution 
established before the Reform. With the market-oriented reform being carried on 
successfully for over 20 years, China experienced huge changes in its economic sector. 
Naturally, Chinese foreign investment law calls for a systematic change which could 
make it suit the changed needs of the economic situation. 
                                                 
156 See Shan Wenhua, “Towards a Level Playing Field of Foreign Investment in China”, Journal of World Investment, 
April 2002, at p 330  
157 Admittedly, in the previous years, huge numbers of laws and regulations have been cleaned up by the Chinese 
government, especially after WTO accession. But nevertheless, there still exist lots of outdated legislations.  
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 Chapter Three: Factors shaping the reconstruction of Chinese foreign investment 
law  
 
I. External driving force: China’s accession to the WTO 
Normally, the development of law is initiated by both internal and external factors. 
While the needs of the society in which a certain legal system exists may become the 
internal impetus for such legal development, changes in its outside legal environment 
could be the external one. China’s accession into the WTO is deemed as an important 
change in the macro legal environment for China’s domestic legislation. In fact, the legal 
instrument that sets out the terms and conditions for China’s accession to the WTO, i.e. 
the “Protocol on the Accession of People’s Republic of China” (the Accession Protocol), 
not only provides a comprehensive guideline for China’s immediate improvements in its 
trade and investment environment, but also set further goals for its on-going legal reform. 
While it may be fair to argue that no matter with or without the WTO membership, there 
is no turning back for China’s progress towards a market-oriented economy and rule-
based society, and the WTO accession will not change China’s foreign investment law 
overnight, it definitely provides an impetus for the country to push forward the much 
needed reforms.158 The following chapter will analyze the direct influence and long-term 
implications of WTO accession to the development of Chinese foreign investment law. 
1. An overview of the WTO framework on international investment  
                                                 
158 See Kong Qingjiang, China and the World Trade Organization: A Legal Perspective,  World Scientific, 2002, at 
p61-62 
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The incorporation of investment rules into the WTO framework of multilateral 
trade agreements was not only a significant breakthrough of the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, but also a major achievement of the WTO in establishing 
a multilateral investment protection mechanism. The in-depth reason behind this is that 
international trade and investment are increasingly inter-related159. Although the WTO 
does not contain an investment agreement per se, as a result of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, the WTO began to embody various investment-related rules. The General 
Agreements on Trade in Service (the GATS), the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (the TPIPS Agreement) and the Agreement on Trade-related 
Investment Measures (the TRIMs Agreement) contain such provisions.160
With respect to the GATS, as we know, the supply of many kinds of services to a 
certain market requires the physical presence of the service providers. Article 1.2 of the 
GATS defines “trade in services” as including four categories of supply, one of which is 
supply “by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the 
territory of any other Member”161. The term “commercial presence” is further defined in 
Article XXVIII (d) as: “any type of business or professional establishment, including 
through (i) the constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person, or (ii) the 
creation or maintenance of a branch or a representative office, within the territory of a 
Member for the purpose of supplying a service”162. Consequently, the GATS covers 
forms of commercial establishment which correspond to the notion of FDI. All WTO 
                                                 
159 FDI is a key determinant of trade since a large percentage of trade occurs between affiliated companies. According 
to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), trade within MNCs and arms length trade 
associated with MNCs are estimated to account for 2/3 of world trade, and intra-firm trade alone for 1/3. See Sherif H. 
Seid, Global Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, Ashgate, 2002, at p3 
160 See Kong Qingjiang, supra note 120, at p860 




members have undertaken specific commitment under the GATS concerning the four 
types of service supply. These commitments bind member-state governments to 
guarantee conditions of market access to foreign service-suppliers regarding the service 
types and sectors as stipulated in their respective Schedules of Specific Commitments. In 
the absence of specifications to the contrary, member states shall guarantee both the right 
of entry (Article XVI) and the right to national treatment (Article XVII) in their 
scheduled sectors.163
As to the TRIPS Agreement, it contains rules governing a host country’s 
treatment to foreign companies. Though this Agreement does not directly address FDI, its 
provisions on the minimum standard for the protection of intellectual property rights, 
domestic law enforcement procedures and dispute settlement are all closely related to the 
legal environment affecting FDI. As a matter of fact, many Bilateral Investment Treaties 
include provisions on the protection of intellectual property. Under the TRIPS Agreement, 
each member state is required to enforce the intellectual property protection standard 
demanded by the Agreement to the nationals of other member states in its territory. 
However, the above two agreements will not be analyzed in the following part of 
this thesis. The reason is, as we know, the GATS is mainly concerned with the market 
access issue in the service area, and therefore its influence on the Chinese foreign 
investment law is restricted to the specific legislations that open up new service sectors to 
foreign investors. For example, on Feb. 13 2003, the Ministry of Construction and the 
MOFTEC jointly promulgated the Administration of Foreign-invested Urban Planning 
Services Enterprises Provisions164, which opens the urban planning service sector to 
                                                 
163 Ibid. Also see Kong Qingjiang, supra note 120, at p860-861 
164 For the Chinese text of the regulation, see webpage: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=42900 
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foreign investment. In other words, these recent legislations made in accordance with 
China’s commitments under the GATS only added new bricks to the old construction of 
foreign investment law, and it will not bring significant changes to the established 
framework and particularly, it will not influence the laws on the operation of FIEs. As to 
the TRIPS Agreement, although it also contains investment-related rules, according to the 
Chinese law classification, it is the research subject of intellectual property law rather 
than foreign investment law, thus it will not be discussed in this thesis either. 
As a comparison, the TRIMs Agreement brought massive changes to the Chinese 
foreign investment law and influenced the substantial legal rights and obligations of FIEs 
in its operation period. More importantly, it contributed to the removal of a number of 
discriminatory measures to the FIEs and may lead to the final elimination of the gaps in 
the legal treatment to the domestic-invested enterprises and FIEs. Therefore, the 
following analysis will focus on the influence of the TRIMs Agreement on the Chinese 
foreign investment law. 
2. Direct influence: from the TRIMs Agreement 
a. General information about the TRIMs Agreement 
“Trade-related investment measures” (TRIMs) is one of the three new issues of 
the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations165, and the TRIMs Agreement, as one of the 
final documents of the Round, brought international investment issues into the WTO 
regime for the first time166. The purpose of the Agreement is to promote the expansion 
and progressive liberalization of world trade and facilitate investment across international 
                                                 
165 The other two issues are services and intellectual property protection. 
166 See Zhang Zhiyong and Wang Hui, “TRIMs Agreement and Chinese Foreign Investment Law” (TRIMs Xie Yi Yu 
Zhong Guo Wai Zi Fa), Journal of Legal Science (Fa Xue Za Zhi), 2000 No.1, at p 19 
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frontiers167. According to this Agreement, any TRIM that is in violation of the obligations 
of national treatment and general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in 
the Article III and Article XI of GATT 1994 shall be forbidden. And an illustrative list of 
such TRIMs is contained in the Annex to the Agreement. 168 In short, the list enumerates 
four categories of TRIMs that distorts the international trade and therefore are prohibited 
by the Agreement: local content requirements, trade balancing requirements, domestic 
sales requirement and foreign exchange restrictions169. 
b. Modification to the laws in accordance with the TRIMs Agreement 
In order to keep conformity with its obligations under the WTO accession 
agreement, China amended its three basic FIE laws and two of the three implementing 
rules of the corresponding laws.170
The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
Concerning Amendment of the “Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-
Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures” and The Decision of the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress Concerning Amendment of the “Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises” were concurrently adopted on 
October 31, 2000 by the Standing Committee of the NPC.  Later on March 15, 2001, the 
EJV law was revised by the NPC with the Decision of the National People’s Congress 
Concerning Amendment of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Equity Joint 
Ventures”. Following the amendments to the three major laws, the State Council issued 
                                                 
167 See Yan Wang, supra note12, at p87 
168 See Article 2 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures. For the text of the Agreement, see WTO 
official website: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims_e.htm 
169 See Zhao Weitian, The Legal Rules of World Trade Organization (Shi Mao Zu Zhi de Fa Lv Zhi Du), Jilin People 
Publishing House, 2001, at p 420-422. 
170 The reason why the CJVL Implementing Rules didn’t undergo amendment may be that it was promulgated in 1995 
and its provisions are quite up to date. 
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The Decision of the State Council Concerning Amendment of the "Detailed Implementing 
Rules for the Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises" on April 12, 2001 and The Decision of the State Council Concerning 
Amendment of the “Implementing Regulations for the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Equity Joint Ventures,” on July 22, 2001 respectively.  
After such major amendments, three categories of perceived inconsistencies with 
the TRIMs Agreement were mostly removed from the Chinese foreign investment 
legislations. 
(i) Local content requirements: 
Under the TRIMs Agreement, China is obliged to eliminate a series of restrictions 
on international trade and investment, including practice of local content requirements, 
regardless of whether they are contained in national laws or local regulations. The TRIMs 
Agreement also prohibits the Chinese government from enforcing existing contractual 
agreements that contain local content requirements.171
One explicit source of local content requirement can be found in the “local 
purchase priority” provisions in the FIE laws before amendment. The Decision of the 
National People’s Congress Concerning Amendment of the “Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Equity Joint Ventures” has removed the requirement that equity 
joint ventures give priority to the domestic market when purchasing supplies. This was 
done to comply with the TRIMs rule that member countries cannot require enterprises to 
                                                 
171 See Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China. For the English text of the Protocol, see webpage: 
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=16692 
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purchase or use local products and also to fulfill the pledges China has made during 
WTO negotiations to remove “local content requirements”.172
The new provision of Article 10 of EJV Law (originally Articles 9 before 
amendment) reads:  
“Raw materials, fuel and other such goods and materials required by a joint 
venture within its approved scope of business can be purchased in the domestic market or 
the international market in accordance with the principles of fairness and 
reasonableness.”  
Article 15 of the WFOE Law and Article 19 of the CJV Law underwent similar 
modifications that abolished the local content requirement. 
The Implementing Rules of the respective laws were revised accordingly by the 
State Council. For example, originally Article 57 of the EJV Law Implementing Rules 
reads: “In its purchase of required machinery, equipment, raw materials, fuel, parts, 
means of transport and office equipment, etc., a joint venture has the right to decide 
whether it buys them in China or from abroad. However, where the terms are the same, it 
shall give first priority to purchasing them in China.”  The last sentence was deleted 
from this provision after the amendment. 
However, some experienced practitioners believed that these modifications to the 
“laws in paper” are not enough. They called for total elimination of various internal 
practices of administrative authorities that amount to local content requirement.173 For 
example, during the establishment period of an FIE, Chinese officials often insist that the 
feasibility study reports prepared by the applicants include the stated intention of utilizing 
                                                 
172 See the news article “Joint Venture Law Amended” at http://www.chinalegalchange.com/Archiv01/C0105046.html 
173 See Nancy Leigh, “Local Content Requirements After China’s WTO Entry”, China Law & Practice, Dec. 2001/Jan. 
2002, at p108 
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local-produced parts or components within their future manufacturing processes. 
Sometimes, foreign investors are even obliged to reiterate this commitment in their joint 
venture contracts or articles of association. As in the establishment period, the foreign 
investors are at a comparatively disadvantageous bargaining position to the approval 
authorities, it is very much likely that they would accept such terms, and in practice, these 
commitments can be quite extensive. Particularly, in industries where the number of 
foreign players is tightly controlled by the State, foreign investors may be willing to 
concede even more to the approval authorities. As a matter of fact, FIEs that achieve high 
percentage of local content in their products will be greatly favored by the government. 
Take Volkswagen as an example. Volkswagen, which signed its Shanghai joint venture 
agreement in 1984, achieved between 60% to 90% local content in its Santana model and 
thus it received strong backup from the municipality government. Currently, it holds 
about 58% of China’s sedan market. 
Although there doesn’t appear to be any explicit provisions in the law, it is 
possible that local contents requirement exists in the internal circulated administrative 
documents. Recent comments made by officials of the Ministry of Information Industry 
suggest this might be the case. One official indicated that manufacturers in the PRC are 
required to include at least 60% of local content in their finished products, while failed to 
cite any published legal source. 174  And another instance is in the automobile 
manufacturing sector. The percentage of local contents in automobile joint venture 
contracts negotiated between companies and officials is usually 40% or more, and 
increased over time. That is to say, the foreign automobile makers that could not achieve 
such local content percentage may be kept away from the Chinese market. 
                                                 
174 Ibid 
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Another practice that may amount to local content requirement could be found in 
the classification of tariff rates for some mechanical or electrical products. For instance, 
import of key mobile phone parts enjoys a preferential duty rate of between 7% and 10%, 
whereas import of completed handsets incurs a duty rate of 12%. Furthermore, in order to 
discourage the practice of importing into China completed handsets as dissembled 
components so as to circumvent the higher finished products rate, imported parts or 
components bearing the “essential characteristics” of the finished products will also be 
classified as finished products for tariff purposes and be charged at the higher rate175. 
After entering the WTO, not only the laws in paper shall be revised to be in 
compliance with the WTO rules, but these improper internal practices shall also be 
abolished completely. 
 (ii) Trade balancing requirement 
Trade balancing requirement, also known as foreign exchange balancing 
requirement, restricts the amount of foreign exchange an FIE can use for import purposes 
to an amount related to its foreign exchange income.176 The purpose of this TRIM is to 
keep a balance between the inflow and outflow of foreign exchange to prevent loss of 
foreign exchange.177
The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
Concerning Amendment of the “Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly 
Foreign-Owned Enterprises” deleted paragraph 3 of Article 18 which originally reads: 
“A wholly foreign-owned enterprise shall maintain the foreign exchange balance by itself. 
                                                 
175 Ibid. 
176 See Bhagirath Lal Das, The World Trade Organization: A Guide to the Framework for International Trade, Zed 
Books & Third World Network, 1999, at p142 
177 Zhao Weitian, supra note 169, at p 417 
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If a wholly foreign-owned enterprise sells its products in the Chinese market as approved 
by authorities concerned, and thus causes an imbalance of foreign exchange, the 
authority that approved the domestic sale shall be responsible for solving the 
problem.”178
Similarly, The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress Concerning Amendment of the “Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures”179 also removes the provision that requires 
cooperative joint ventures to balance their foreign exchange receipts and payments on 
their own180.  
Actually, the legal provisions that require the FIEs to achieve foreign exchange 
balancing on their own were stipulated at a time when foreign exchange was in acute 
shortage in China. Over a fairly long period of time after the Reform and Open Policy, 
China experienced severe shortage of foreign exchange due to its poor performance in 
foreign trade, and the State Treasury had very little foreign exchange reserve. Therefore, 
the State was compelled by the reality of foreign exchange shortage to promulgate 
regulations requiring FIEs to make their ends meet with the foreign exchange on their 
own.181  
But with the institutional reform in the foreign trade sector in China in the 1990s, 
China’s export saw a steady and continuous development and its foreign exchange kept 
increasing. In 1994, the conditional convertibility of RMB and foreign currencies was 
                                                 
178 For the Chinese text of the amendment, see webpage: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=175 
179 For the Chinese text of the amendment, see webpage: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=180 
180 Article 20 of the old CJV Law, which was deleted in this amendment, reads “A cooperative joint venture shall 
maintain foreign exchange balance by itself. If a cooperative joint venture cannot maintain foreign exchange balance, 
it can apply for assistance from authorities concerned, according to national rules.” 
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allowed under the current account. In July 1996, China incorporated the foreign exchange 
transactions of FIEs into the national bank settlement system and lifted the limits on 
foreign exchange remittance under the current account. In December of the same year, 
China made a further step forward, as it announced acceptance of the Article 8 of the 
International Monetary Fund Agreement and realized the convertibility of RMB under 
the current account182 . Presently, the payment by FIEs to purchase supplies as raw 
materials, spare parts or pay salaries, dividends, etc. can all be made through purchasing 
foreign exchange from banks or through their own foreign exchange accounts183. As a 
matter of fact, the provisions requiring the FIE to maintain foreign exchange balance by 
itself have long been void of any practical significance. Besides, according to the latest 
news report, the foreign exchange reserve of China is more than 360 billion US dollars by 
the end of August 2003, second only to Japan in the world184. With such abundant foreign 
exchange reserve, elimination of trade-balancing requirement won’t negatively influence 
China’s international revenue and expenditure conditions.185
(iii) Export performance requirement 
 Pursuant to 7.3 of Part 1 “General Provisions” of its Accession Protocol, upon 
accession to the WTO, China shall eliminate export requirement made effective through 
laws, regulations or other measures186. 
 Article 3 of the old WFOE Law reads “Enterprises with foreign capital shall be 
established in such a manner as to help the development of China's national economy; 
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they shall use advanced technology and equipment or market all or most of their products 
outside China.” The mandatory condition for all wholly-foreign-owned enterprises to be 
export oriented or technologically advanced was abolished after the revision of the law. 
The wording of this clause was changed to: “The state encourages the establishment of 
product-exporting and technology-advanced wholly-foreign-owned enterprises”. 
 The Implementing Rules of the WFOE Law was amended accordingly on April 
12, 2001. Its Article 3 was changed to read: “The State encourages wholly-foreign-owned 
enterprises to apply advanced technology and equipment, to engage in new product 
development, to upgrade products and to save energy and raw materials; it also 
encourages the establishment of export-oriented wholly-foreign-owned enterprises.” 
Export performance requirement was no longer a precondition for the set-up of wholly-
foreign-owned enterprises in China. 
 In addition to these explicit export performance requirements in the FIE laws, 
there are also some ambiguous clauses which may amount to export performance 
requirement. For instance, before the amendment of the WFOE Law Implementing Rules, 
foreign investors shall submit a report to the local government at or above the county 
level at the place where the proposed enterprise is to be established prior to the filing of 
application for the establishment of the enterprise. Under the old rules, the report shall 
include information on the proportion of the sales of products between the domestic and 
the foreign market187. And the written application for the establishment of the FIE shall 
also contain this information.188 Such compulsory disclosure requirements can be deemed 
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as either an export requirement or a domestic sales requirement189, both of which are in 
violation of China’s commitments under its WTO accession agreement. In order to avoid 
ambiguities190, these clauses were also deleted in the amendment. 
3. Long-term implications: application of national treatment 
 a. Prospect of incorporation of national treatment requirement into the WTO 
framework 
 These modifications to the foreign investment laws were warmly welcomed and 
highly evaluated by both of the foreign investors and foreign governments. Jon M. 
Huntsmen Jr., Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, commented in his speech in a hearing 
before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China191 that: “Looking back on the 
first 6 months of China's WTO membership, we have seen China take a good faith 
approach to its WTO membership and make significant efforts to implement its 
commitments”.192  However, as some scholars pointed out, these amendments to the 
specific laws and regulations are just technical changes rather than fundamental shift. The 
general foreign investment legal regime has not been touched at all and the problem of 
applying the Company Law to the foreign invested enterprises was not addressed either. 
Therefore, the limitation of these amendments is obvious.193
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 From a long-term perspective, the implications of WTO accession to the 
Chinese foreign investment law cannot be simply understood as some modifications to 
the specific legal stipulations194. Broadly speaking, almost all the FDIs are accompanied 
by the import and export of goods, services and technologies, therefore many multilateral 
trade agreements under the WTO legal regime include regulations on the international 
investment issues. Because of this, some scholars believe that the international 
investment regulations in the WTO legal regime are the latest and the most significant 
development of the international investment law195. Actually, the WTO legal framework 
not only includes rules that directly regulate international investments, like the GATS, the 
TRIMs and the TRIPS, it also exerts important influence on the flow of international 
investments through some of its other agreements. For example, the Government 
Procurement Agreement may regulate the commercial tendering activities of foreign 
investors, and the Anti-dumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures regulate the product sales, import and export activities of these 
foreign investors. It’s safe to draw the conclusion that since the establishment of the 
WTO, the international investment law achieved a substantial step forward towards 
multilateral level196. Now, the international investment activities are not merely regulated 
by the domestic foreign investment laws of host states, bilateral investment treaties and a 
few multilateral investment treaties such as the MIGA (The Multilateral Investment 
                                                 
194 See Liu Sun, “WTO Legal Rules System and Foreign Investment Law Reform”, Legal Science, No.4, 2000, at p105 
195 See Shan Wenhua, “Analysis of the International Investment Rules in the WTO Agreements”, Legal Science 
Research, Vol.18, No.2 
196 See Liu Sun, The International Legal System of the Protection of International Investment—A Study of Some 
Important Legal Issues, Mar. 2002, Law Press, at p286-287 
 86
Guarantee Agency), they are also subject to the regulation of the multilateral trade legal 
regime197. 
 The principle of free market economy and free trade, which is the soul of the 
WTO rules, is the most profound reason that the multilateral trade rules of the WTO 
significantly influenced the foreign investment laws of its member states. A series of free 
trade principles in the WTO legal regime, such as the principle of general elimination of 
quantitative restrictions, the principles of non-discrimination, most-favoured nation 
treatment, national treatment and transparency of laws and policies, are all aimed at 
opening the market and reducing government intervention with the marketplace. Its 
purpose is to promote the free flow of goods, services and technologies on a global level. 
Therefore, the WTO rules could contribute to the further liberalization of the government 
policy and legislative approach of its member states to the foreign investment, and it 
could foster the practice of free competition and national treatment to foreign investors 
among its member states.   
 Admittedly, this is still a prospect till now, and radical changes are illusive 
under the present WTO legal framework, because the direct legal effects of WTO rules 
on domestic foreign investment legislations of its member states are quite limited. Some 
Chinese scholars have a popular misunderstanding regarding the national treatment 
obligation mentioned in Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, they believe that for the first 
time, the TRIMs Agreement introduce into the international investment area a general 
national treatment requirement to foreign investment in all aspects of its operations in the 
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host state.198 Actually, the text of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement reads: “Without 
prejudices to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply and 
TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III and Article XI of GATT 1994”. 
The national treatment requirement quoted by the TRIMs Agreement is contained in 
Article III of GATT 1994 which only regulates the relationship between the imported 
products and domestic products in the domestic market. It does not impose any 
mandatory requirement on its member state to apply national treatment to foreign 
investment in other aspects.199
 But the WTO legal framework is not a set of standstill rules; on the contrary, it 
will experience ongoing changes from time to time. Every multilateral agreement under 
the WTO framework may be subject to later updates due to the regular or irregular new 
rounds of trade negotiations.200 The TRIMs Agreement even contains explicit stipulations 
of mandatory review requirement, which is rarely seen in other agreements under the 
WTO legal framework. Article 9 of the TRIMs Agreement reads: “Not later than five 
years after the date of entry into force of the WTO agreement, the Council for Trade in 
Goods shall review the operation of this Agreement and, as appropriate, propose to the 
Ministerial Conference amendments to its text. In the course of this review, the Council 
for Trade in Goods shall consider whether the Agreement should be complemented with 
provisions on investment policy and competition policy.” This pertinently reflects the 
interim nature of the TRIMs Agreement.  And to some extent, it is also an epitome of the 
struggle between the North (the developed countries) and the South (the developing 
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countries) concerning the establishment of multilateral investment rules within the WTO 
framework.  
 The TRIMs Agreement is an outcome of compromise reached by the developed 
countries and the developing countries. In order to enhance the protection to the overseas 
investment interests of their nationals and raise the investment treatment standard of the 
host states, the developed countries had made considerable and constant efforts to set up 
a multilateral investment legal framework, but their tries either failed or the results were 
not satisfactory in the past. The essential reason for these failures is that the multilateral 
investment codes proposed by the developed states paid attention to the protection of the 
investors’ interests unilaterally but neglected the reciprocal obligations of the foreign 
investors and the sovereignty of the developing countries. Because of the sensibility of 
sovereign issues in the developing countries, it is difficult to conclude a comprehensive 
multilateral investment treaty which could compromise or coordinate the interests of 
countries at different development level. Incorporation of investment rules into the WTO 
regime is a methodological innovation of the developed states in its efforts to raise the 
international investment protection standard and to weaken the regulatory authority of the 
host state over foreign investment201. From the perspective of the developed states, to 
negotiate investment issues in the multilateral trade forum could enable them to transfer 
their negotiation powers in the international trade area to the investment area. They could 
press the developing countries to voluntarily restrict their sovereign control over the 
foreign investment in exchange for the tariff reduction and opening of market on the side 
of the developed states.202 The result proved that this strategy was quite effective. Ostry 
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characterized the Uruguay Round as a North-South Grand Bargain.203 According to her 
analysis, the Uruguay Round was essentially an implicit deal: the opening of developed 
countries’ market to agriculture and labour-intensive manufactured goods, especially 
textiles and clothing, for the inclusion into the trading system of GATS, TRIPS and 
(albeit to a lesser extent than originally demanded) TRIMs.204
 In this way, the developed countries successfully brought investment issues into 
the WTO regime205. Although presently, the scope is still confined to the listed “trade-
related” investment measures and full transformation is still underway206, the door has 
been opened for future expansion,207 as Burt commented: “Realistically, the ability of 
developed country trade ministers to achieve their agenda through political maneuvering 
and a linkage of concessions will likely enable the developed countries to set a course for 
negotiations on direct investment. The limiting language in the Singapore Declaration208 
will not have its current effect in a few years. Developed countries will determine the 
areas where developing countries will accept concessions in return for allowing the start 
of direct investment negotiations. The TRIMs Agreement, to which many developing 
countries were opposed, was hammered out in a similar fashion.” 209  The latest 
development might prove his expectations to be correct. In the Fourth Ministerial 
                                                 
203 See Sylvia Ostry, “The WTO: Post Seattle and Chinese Accession”, China and The Long March to Global Trade: 
The Accession of China to the World Trade Organization, edited by Sylvia Ostry, Alan S. Alexandroff and Rafael 
Gomez, Routledge, 2002, at p10-p11 
204 Ibid. 
205 See James L. Kenworthy, “US Trade Policy and the World Trade Organization: The Unraveling of the Seattle 
Conference and the Future of the WTO”, Spring 2000, The Georgetown Public Policy Review, at p104 
206 See Sylvia Ostry, supra note203, at p11 
207 Mu Yaping and Huang Yong, supra note 190, at p118 
208 At the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference of the WTO, a working group was formed to examine the possible 
broadening of the TRIMs Agreement, which the Agreement itself mandates. Originally, The developed countries 
intended to let the newly established working group lead to discussions on a comprehensive agreement on direct 
investment, but this intention was resisted by the developing countries led by India. 
209 See Eric M. Burt, “Note and Comment: Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign 
Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization”, American University Journal of International Law & Policy, 
Vol.12, 1997, at p 1052-1053 
 90
Meeting of the WTO at Doha, Qatar on 14 November 2001, the prospects for 
international rules on FDI received a shot in the arm in the form of paragraphs 20-22 of 
the final Declaration, assuring at last that the subject of investment is on the agenda for 
potential inclusion in the new round of trade negotiations. According to the wording of 
the Declaration, in the context of the new round, actual negotiations toward a multilateral 
framework for investment will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference.210
 A brief retrospect of the marathon course of the Uruguay Round may further 
help to explain why and how the developing countries made concessions to the developed 
states in the past negotiations. In the beginning of the Uruguay Round negotiations, a 
group of developing countries, tagged the “G10 hardliners” and led by India and Brazil 
were bitterly opposed to the inclusion of “new issues” to the negotiating agenda. But 
without the new issues being incorporated into the Round it is impossible that the 
American business community or American politicians would have supported the 
initiation of a new-round multilateral negotiations, and to some extent, indeed, the long 
delay in launching the new Round was the deciding factor in the origin of the US multi-
track policy in the 1980s which included bilateralism and unilateralism. To amplify the 
message to the G10, in 1985 the little-used Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, an 
instrument of aggressive unilateralism was activated by the US government, and soon 
afterwards a new Special Section 301 of the 1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act 
specially targeted at developing countries with inadequate intellectual property protection 
was also launched. As the Uruguay Round negotiations proceeded, the message from 
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Brasilia and New Delhi became clearer: given a choice between American sanctions or a 
negotiated multilateral arrangement, an agreement includes “new issues” looked better.211 
Thus, well before the end of the Round, the “hardliner coalition” had disappeared and 
many undertook unilateral liberalization of tariffs and other trade barriers. By December 
1993, some of the former hardliner developing countries were among the strongest 
supporters of the negotiations they had so adamantly opposed in the 1980s.212
 Another impetus that might urge the developing countries to make further 
concessions is the peer pressure from other developing countries. It is very much likely 
that developing countries would loosen their sovereign control over foreign investment in 
future WTO negotiations due to the increasingly intense competition among themselves 
for foreign investment. Before the 1970s, many newly-independent developing countries 
held a cautious, even skeptical attitude to the foreign investment in order to ensure 
economic independence213. However, by the onset of the 1990s, the world experienced 
great changes in its macro political and economic environment and accordingly 
influenced the developing countries’ attitude towards foreign investment profoundly. The 
debt crisis of the 1980s and thus the role of the IMF and the World Bank, plus the 
collapses of the former Soviet states in Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall – a 
confluence of two sets of unrelated events – ushered in a major transformation in the 
economic policy paradigm. Development of national economy has become the foremost 
task for the governments of developing countries, and naturally, utilization of foreign 
investment was seen as an essential element for launching and sustaining economic 
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growth.214 Presently, international investment took place mainly between the developed 
countries. The percentage of inter-investments among developed countries in the total 
amount of transnational capital flow increased from 61% in 1997 to 63% in 1998. 
Therefore, in order to attract the limited resources of foreign investment, many 
developing countries modified their domestic foreign investment laws to facilitate the 
entry of foreign investment.215 Over the period of 1991 to 1996, some 95% of a total of 
599 changes in the regulatory FDI regimes of developing countries were in the direction 
of liberalization.216 These changes mostly involved the opening of industries previously 
closed to foreign investment, streamlining or abolition of approval procedures and 
providing of incentives. This trend of unilateral liberalization of foreign investment 
regulations in developing countries is rarely seen before217. The growing pressure on 
developing states to compete for FDI might push them into a race in the speed of foreign 
investment liberalization, as naturally, foreign investment tends to flow into the countries 
with less market restrictions and governmental interferences218. 
 If the investment rules are going to be incorporated into the WTO regime or a 
multilateral investment legal framework is going to be erected, one essential objective the 
developed states want to achieve is the application of national treatment by the 
developing states, which are usually the host states for foreign investment. This can be 
seen from the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) which was proposed by the 
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OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). National treatment, 
together with most-favored nation treatment and transparency requirement, was deemed 
as the three basic pillars of the MAI legal framework219. Jeffrey Lang, Deputy United 
States Trade Representative, once explained the standpoint of the U.S. government 
towards MAI: “We intend for the MAI agreement to provide a broad multilateral 
framework for international investment, with high standards for the liberalization of 
investment regimes, investment protection, and effective dispute settlement. Specific key 
elements should be ······ the better of national or MFN treatment, including application to 
the making of investments, with only limited exceptions”220.  
 b. National treatment and transformation of Chinese foreign investment law 
 (i). National treatment: the attitude of Chinese government 
 Application of national treatment to foreign investment would bring more 
fundamental changes to the Chinese foreign investment law compared to the current 
TRIMs Agreement221.  
 Actually, national treatment is not a new topic to China. As early as in 1993, 
“The Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
concerning Several Problems on the Establishment of Socialist Market Economy”, 
Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth General Meeting of the CCP, 
officially declared: “to create conditions to apply national treatment to the foreign 
invested enterprises”. Later in 1996, in “The Ninth ‘Five Year Plan’ for the Development 
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of National Economy and Society and Outline of the Long-term Objective for the Year 
2010”, which was adopted in the Fourth Session of the Eighth General Assembly of the 
NPC, the government announced that “gradually unify the policy to the domestic and 
foreign investment, and apply national treatment to the foreign invested enterprises”.222 
At the local government level, according to a local regulation of the Shenzhen SEZ, from 
Jan.1 1997, Shenzhen SEZ would start to apply national treatment to the FIEs and foreign 
nationals within the SEZ223. Although in these official documents, and also in some 
Chinese scholars’ writings, there was a common misunderstanding concerning the nature 
of application of national treatment in China224, as strictly speaking, national treatment 
cannot be applied to FIEs because FIEs are Chinese legal persons while national 
treatment is a treatment standard applied to foreign nationals, the importance of accord 
national treatment to foreign investment is acknowledged by the Chinese government.  
 Another major legal source of national treatment is the BITs (Bilateral 
Investment Treaties) that China had signed with foreign governments. Normally, the 
Chinese-styled national treatment clause in its BITs include three models: first, the 
Chinese government promises to “endeavor to provide the same treatment standard as its 
nationals to the investors of the other contracting party according to its laws and 
regulations”, as can be found in Article 3, Paragraph 3 of the 1986 Sino-UK BIT225 and 
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Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the 1993 Sino-Slovenia BIT226. An example of the second 
model is Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the 1995 Sino-Morocco BIT227 which stipulates that 
the contracting governments shall “promise to provide the investors of the other 
contracting party the treatment standard not less favorable than that enjoyed by its 
nationals according to its laws and regulations”. The third kind of national treatment 
clause can be found in the 1988 Sino-Japan BIT228. Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Sino-
Japan BIT stipulates: “The treatment accorded by either contracting party within its 
territory to nationals and companies of the other contracting party with respect to 
investment, returns and business activities in connection with the investment shall not be 
less favourable than that accorded to national and companies of the former contracting 
party”. From the wording of the provision, this seems to be a general national treatment 
clause without restrictions, but regrettably the Implementation Protocol attached to the 
Sino-Japan BIT as an annex set out substantive restrictions to the national treatment 
clause contained in the main body of the treaty. Article 3 of the Protocol reads: “For the 
purpose of the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Agreement, it shall not be 
deemed ‘treatment less favourable’ for either contracting party to accord discriminatory 
treatment, in accordance with its applicable laws and regulations, to nationals and 
companies of the other contracting party, in case it is really necessary for the reason of 
public order, national security and sound development of national economy” 229 . 
Admittedly, the national treatment clauses contained in Chinese BITs have limitations, as 
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in the first case, the Chinese government actually doesn’t entail any treaty obligation to 
provide national treatment considering the elastic wording of “endeavor”; in the second 
one, although there are no such restrictive wordings as “endeavor”, contracting states can 
still impose restrictions on the extent of national treatment applicable to the foreign 
investors with its domestic laws and regulations; and in the third model, the 
supplementary provision cancelled the obligation of national treatment, especially due to 
the effect of the wording “(for the reason of) sound development of national economy” 
which can be construed very flexibly. So actually in none of the three situations does the 
Chinese government assume a mandatory obligation to provide national treatment to 
foreign investors, and the national treatment clauses contained in these BITs are sort of 
declarations rather than legal stipulations.  
 Nevertheless, even though the above mentioned legal documents do not have 
binding force on the Chinese government, they clearly expressed the Chinese 
government’s attitude towards national treatment and set out the prospect of application 
of national treatment to foreign investment in the near future.  
 (ii). Relationship between national treatment and structural change of Chinese 
foreign investment law 
 In fact, the real obstacle to the application of national treatment to the foreign 
investment, which consequently calls for a structural change in the Chinese foreign 
investment law, is that there is still no unified treatment standard to the corporate 
“nationals” of China. 230  National treatment, as a comparative treatment standard, is 
realized by referring to the legal rights and obligations of a “national” of the host state. Its 
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precondition is that the establishment and operation of a domestic enterprise in the host 
state shall be governed by a unified law. If the domestic-invested enterprises and FIEs are 
regulated by two separate sets of laws, as what is happening in China, application of 
national treatment will, by all means, be defeated because a unified “national treatment 
standard” cannot be properly induced from the two sets of laws231. So the existence of the 
“double track system” in the Chinese corporate legislation area imposed an 
unconquerable difficulty to the application of national treatment, which has been written 
into the official documents of the Chinese government. In this sense, the further 
development of the WTO legal regime might motivate the structural transformation of 
Chinese foreign investment law. 
 
II. Internal impetus: further market-oriented economic reform and transformation of 
Chinese foreign investment law 
 The economic reform policy towards a market-oriented economy has been 
carried out by the Chinese government for more than two decades. When this policy was 
first introduced, China was in desperate need of foreign investment. Almost all the 
market sectors were seriously underdeveloped and the legal system was inadequate to 
deal with the complexities of foreign investment transactions. In order to handle these 
problems, a self-contained foreign investment legal framework was established. However, 
today, the entrenched differentiation between foreign investment and domestic 
investment poses a great problem to the further market-oriented reform in China. As 
under a market economy, where the market and competition allocate resources, it is not 
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only possible, but also necessary to provide equal treatment to all domestic economic 
entities in the marketplace232. A free market economy requires that different enterprises 
are competing with each other on an equal footing. The internal need of further reform 
and opening-up may play an even more important role in the transformation of Chinese 
foreign investment law233.  
   The need of further market reform has already demonstrated its direct 
influence on the Chinese foreign investment law during the tidal amendments to the FIE 
laws before WTO accession. Some changes in the EJV Law were not related to WTO 
accession. The first example is that the wording “the production and business operation 
plans of an EJV shall be submitted to the competent authority for record and shall be 
implemented through economic contracts” was deleted from Article 9 of the EJV Law. 
Gu Angran, head of the Legislative Affairs Committee of the Standing Committee of the 
NPC explained the reason for this change in his report to the NPC: “Under the socialist 
market economy, enterprises have the freedom to make their own business decisions, and 
the government only engages in macro-economic administration and won’t interfere with 
the business activities of the enterprises”.234 Another change is that the right to amend 
the EJV Law is shifted from the General Assembly of the NPC to its Standing Committee. 
The advantage is that compared to the General Assembly of the NPC which is convened 
only once a year, the Standing Committee could amend the law in a timely manner to 
meet the changing needs of the economic reform235. Although the third change, the 
abolishment of domestic purchase requirement was mainly intended to conform to the 
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national treatment requirement of the TRIMs Agreement which has been addressed above, 
it is also based on the need of establishing a socialist market economy. Mr. Gu said: “Our 
consideration for the amendment is that purchase of supplies shall be decided by the 
enterprises themselves according to the market situation and the principle of fairness and 
reasonableness in a market economy environment, and it is not appropriate for the 
government to interfere. FIEs, like other Chinese corporate nationals, shall have such 
free purchasing rights.”236
 One cheering sign has been noticed in recent Chinese legislation that may 
finally bring out the confluence of the treatment standards to the FIEs and domestic-
invested enterprises, and this can even lead to the final elimination of the trench between 
the two “tracks”. It seems that Chinese government has started to reconsider its 
traditional preferential treatment policy to foreign investment. In July 2000, the 
MOFTEC and the SAIC jointly issued the Investment within China by Foreign 
Investment Enterprises Tentative Provisions (commonly referred to as the “Re-
investment Regulations”). The Re-investment Regulations contain some inconsistencies 
regarding FIE status and corresponding treatment. On one hand, domestic investment 
made by the FIEs shall be in compliance with the requirements of the Catalogue for the 
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industry (the “Guidance Catalogue”), and as usual 
foreign investment shares in the invested company shall not be less than 25% of its total 
investment. From this aspect, investment made by the FIEs is still regarded as foreign 
investment because it is subject to the regulation of foreign investment rules. On the other 
hand, the Re-investment Regulations do not grant preferential tax treatment to the 
invested company, which FIEs normally could enjoy. Of course it is arguable that the 
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FIEs are actually domestic investors, and therefore any investment they made shall be 
construed as domestic rather than foreign investment. However, recent regulations on 
foreign investment in listed companies seem to indicate that the government did start to 
adopt a different approach. The Transfer of State Shares and Legal Person Shares in 
Listed Companies to Foreign Investors Circular237 sets out that after the transfer of 
shares to foreign investors, the listed company will not enjoy FIE preferential treatment, 
while the acquisition of state-owned or legal person shares by foreign investors is still 
subject to the regulation of the Guidance Catalogue.238 Several days later, the Qualifying 
Foreign Institutional Investors Investing in Domestic Securities Markets Tentative 
Procedures (QFII Tentative Procedures) was adopted by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission and the People’s Bank of China. The QFII Tentative Procedures set strict 
entry requirement on “Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors” (QFII) but keep silent on 
whether the listed companies with QFII investments qualify for preferential treatment. An 
experienced attorney commented that, taking the wording of the regulation into account, 
it is very much unlikely that the invested company could not enjoy preferential 
treatment239.     
 The purpose of the government seems to be targeting at final erasion of the gap 
between the domestic-invested enterprises and foreign invested enterprises. Actually, 
foreign investors are anxious to be real local players in China market, and preferential 
treatment is no longer the paramount consideration for them.240 It is high time for the 
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government to concurrently abolish the preferential and discriminative treatment to the 
foreign investment and offer the domestic and foreign investors a “fair-playing” field. 
In summary, the recent massive amendment of Chinese foreign investment law is 
a continuity and development of China’s consistent process of market-oriented reform, 
though it is also a well-timed preparation for China’s accession to the WTO. Nevertheless, 
it is important to point out that the two sides — the internal side of establishing a free 
market economy and the external side of entering into the WTO- are in harmony instead 
of contradiction. Both of the two forces are market and rule-based. Needless to say, the 
WTO could be deemed as a powerful instrument to push forward such massive and 
radical economic and social changes.241
 
Chapter Four: Prospect of future development of foreign investment law 
  
I. Three basic foreign investment legislation models in the world 
 Regulatory frameworks of foreign investment law differ vastly from countries 
to countries. Not all countries have enacted comprehensive investment laws or 
consolidated the laws relating to foreign investment in a single code. In many cases, 
foreign investment legislation is fragmented and regulates only specific aspects of 
investment activity. 
 Basically, there are three foreign investment legislation models around the 
world.  
 The first one is to generally apply domestic laws to the foreign investors, which 
is adopted by most of the developed countries. Usually, developed countries with 
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matured free-market economic system, have already established a sophisticated 
regulatory framework, ranging from regulations on competition to laws on labor, 
environment, health and consumer protection, as well as industry-specific regulations 
dealing with various services, natural resources, energy industries, etc. And such legal 
frameworks govern both domestic and foreign investors and thus there are no separate 
foreign investment laws that specifically address FDI. The United States is one of the 
typical examples. The United States doesn’t have specific foreign investment code and 
foreign investors generally enjoy national treatment. For instance, the American antitrust 
laws and unfair competition laws regulate FDI in the same manner as they deal with 
domestic investment. They may prohibit or eliminate FDI if free economic competition is 
hindered. Securities laws also regulate foreign direct investment. The Securities Act of 
1933 “requires all entities, foreign or domestic, issuing stock . . . to file a registration 
statement which includes the name of the issuer . . . and the names . . . of all persons 
owning more than ten percent of any stock class.” 242  Non-compliance with the 
registration requirements can lead to a stop order by the Securities & Exchange 
Commission, halting the particular foreign direct investment activity.243  Many other 
developed countries, like the United Kingdom, France, Netherlands and Sweden also 
adopted this approach and regulate foreign investment with the same laws that govern 
domestic investment activities.  
 The second legislation model is to regulate foreign investment with a 
comprehensive foreign investment code. Increasingly, foreign investment legislation in 
developing countries takes the form of a code or a single piece of legislation that states all 
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the pertinent rules relating to the making of a foreign investment in a state. Besides 
facilitating the promotional purposes behind such codes, the existence of a single code 
enables the foreign investor to acquaint himself with the laws on foreign investment of a 
state more easily.244 Take Argentina as an example. Foreign investment is regulated in 
Argentina by law No.21.382 enacted in 1976 (the “Foreign Investment Law of 1976”) as 
amended by laws No.22.208 enacted in 1980, No.23.697 of 1989 and No.23.760 of 1990. 
In September 1993 the Executive Power enacted decree No.1852/93 approving the new 
updated text of the Foreign Investment Law, which combined in one piece of former 
legislations. The new Foreign Investment Law of Argentina has now been reduced to a 
few provisions which mainly highlight the three basic principles of Argentine foreign 
investment law: right to access all economic area without needing any type of prior 
approval; right of repatriation of profits; principle of equal treatment between domestic 
and foreign investors.245 And at the same time, its domestic company law, contract law, 
labor law and so on, are still generally applied to enterprises with foreign investment. 
Some other developing countries also adopted this approach, like Chili, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and Syria, etc. Normally, the market economies of these countries were 
underdeveloped at the time of passage of the foreign investment code, and domestic laws 
on regulation of the marketplace were far from matured, therefore, foreign investment 
legislation was done separately. Although very few developed countries employed this 
legislative approach, Canada, Japan and Australia also have enacted separate laws 
regulating foreign investment. In Canada, the Foreign Investment Review Act of 1974 
created the Foreign Investment Review Agency, which was in charge of screening 
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foreign direct investment involving acquisition of existing Canadian enterprises as well 
as establishment of new ones. In 1985, the Investment Canada Act was enacted to replace 
the act of 1974 and established a new agency, Investment Canada, with the specific 
mandate to encourage and facilitate foreign investment in Canada. The Investment 
Canada Act is an example of legislation which provides for the establishment of foreign 
investment by law of a well-integrated screening system with prescribed procedures.246 
This legislative approach is still different from that of China. Some scholars called it 
“unified foreign investment legislation mode”247.  
 The third model, which is seen in China, as well as some former Soviet Union 
states and Eastern European countries, is to pass a series of specific foreign investment 
laws and regulations to regulate the activities of foreign investment248. The difference 
between the second and the third models is that there is no single foreign investment code 
in the countries that adopted the third approach. Usually, those countries experienced 
gradual economic reform and opening of domestic market, and the foreign investment 
laws were designed to meet the legislative needs of that specific phase only. Hence, 
foreign investment laws were fragmented and there was no single foreign investment 
code. As a comparison to the “unified foreign investment legislation mode”, some 
scholars named this model “dispersed foreign investment legislation mode”249. 
 II. Theories concerning the reconstruction of Chinese foreign investment 
law 
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 Accordingly, several competing theories on the reconstruction of Chinese 
foreign investment law are hotly debated in China in recent years.  
 1. Complete removal of foreign investment laws 
 The most radical, thus somewhat impractical view is to completely remove the 
foreign investment laws and generally apply domestic laws to the foreign investment, like 
the first model which is adopted by the United States and other developed countries.  
 In a fairly long period of time, this approach cannot be available to China. 
Because as a developing country, China still has many underdeveloped industries that 
need the special protection from the government. Actually, nurturing weak industries is a 
common practice for developing countries, even for the developed countries in their early 
development stage. Absolute application of national treatment to foreign investment will 
bring disastrous effects to the growing domestic industries. Therefore, it is very much 
unlikely that Chinese foreign investment legislation would adopt this model. 
 2. A unified FIE code 
 On the contrary, the most conservative theory is to unify the three FIE laws into 
one code and keep most of the other laws untouched. 
 After the tidal amendments to the foreign investment laws before WTO 
accession, some contents of the respective laws have been changed, but nothing has been 
done to the entire legal framework. As some scholars suggested, although perfection of 
the contents would be welcomed, without a proper structure they still cannot work well. 
At the moment, the number of Chinese foreign investment laws and regulations remains a 
mystery, even government officials themselves may have difficulties telling how many 
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there are. Therefore, they argued that China should consolidate its three basic FIE laws 
and their respective Implementing Rules to form a unified FIE code.250
 There are several reasons for such consolidation proposes. 
 First of all, presently, there are many repetitious parts in the three FIE laws.251 
Since the FIE laws and their respective regulations are governing more or less similar 
enterprises in parallel, it is unavoidable that they are quite similar to each other both in 
structure and contents, particularly the EJV law and the CJV law. For example, the three 
basic FIE laws all contain provisions concerning the purposes of the laws and protection 
of FIEs. They laid down similar approval mechanisms, i.e. the approval authorities and 
their competences, approval terms, procedures and required documentations, etc. for the 
establishment of FIEs. As to the corporate structure of EJV and CJV, except those CJVs 
that are not organized in LLC form, the provisions in the EJV law and CJV law on 
corporate governance are basically the same. Hence, these repetitious contents would 
better be incorporated into one single FIE code. 
Table 2: Repetitious parts in the three FIE laws 
Contents EJV Law CJV Law WFOE Law 
Legislative purpose Article 1 Article 1 Article 1 
Legal status of the enterprise “Implementing Rules” 
Article 2 
Article 2 Article 8 
Non-nationalization Article 2  Article 5 
Approval authority Article 3 Article 5 Article 6 
Registration authority Article 3 Article 6 Article 7 
Investment methods Article 5 Article 8  
Registration period “Implementing Rules” Article 6 Article 7 
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Article 11 
Board of directors Article 6 Article 12  
Employment and firing of staff Article 6, Para. 4 Article 13 Article12 
Tax incentives Article 7, Para. 2 Article 20 Article 17 
Establishment of Labor Union “Implementing Rules” 
Article 84-88 
Article14 Article 13 
Transfer of capital Article 4, Para. 4 Article 10  
Foreign exchange regulation Article 9, Para. 1, 2 Article 16 Article18 
Business autonomy “Implementing Rules” 
Article 5 
Article 11 Article 11 
Insurance issues Article 9, Para. 4 Article 18 Article16 
Remittance of legal income Article 11 Article 23, Para. 2 Article 19 




Article 15 Article 14 
Re-investment tax refund Article 8, Para. 3  Article 17, Para.2 
Purchase of supplies Article 9, Para. 2 Article 19 Article 15 
Dispute resolution Article 15 Article 25  
 
 Secondly, a unified FIE code could avoid legal loopholes and discrepancies 
existing in the present laws. Some important legal issues were not addressed in the 
current FIE laws. For example, in EJV practice, if the directors of one party refuse to 
attend the board meetings, the board may not be able to pass any effective resolution, as 
the quorum required by the law may not be met. It can create deadlock in EJV operations 
but regrettably the law is silent on such a crucial problem of corporate governance. As to 
the contradictions in the three FIE laws, one example is that while there are provisions on 
nationalization and compensation in the EJV Law and the WFOE Law, no such clauses 
can be found in either the CJV Law or its Implementing Rules. It reflects the lack of 
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coordination in the three FIE laws themselves.252 It is expected that in a unified code 
these legal loopholes and discrepancies could be fixed. 
 Supporters of this theory argued that as a matter of fact, China has already on 
the way of unifying its FIE laws. Except the three main FIE laws, a lot of complementary 
regulations and related laws address FIEs collectively, rather than treating them 
separately. One successful experience is the unification of tax law of foreign invested 
enterprises. In 1991, the NPC passed the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of 
China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, which unified 
the income tax rate for the FIEs and foreign enterprises to 30% of national tax and 3% of 
local tax, and concurrently nullified the former EJV Tax Law and Foreign Enterprises 
Tax law253. 
 In all, a unified FIE code can be justifiable, since it will eliminate the repetitious 
parts in the current laws, avoid discrepancies and legal loopholes, and simplify the legal 
framework to make it more accessible for foreign investors. However, the “double track 
system” will still exist after such consolidation. Foreign invested enterprises will still be 
governed by a separate set of laws, thus it can be just another transitional change254. 
 3. Universal application of domestic enterprise laws  
 As discussed above, further market-oriented reform calls for a fair playing field 
for both FIEs and domestic-invested enterprises, and future development of the WTO 
may motivate the Chinese government to apply national treatment to foreign investors, 
both of which require a complete elimination of the trench between FIEs and domestic-
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invested enterprises. But the proposal to consolidate the three FIE laws, though it would 
simplify the present labyrinthine foreign investment legal framework, retains the “double 
track system”. It can be regarded as an interim step of the legal reform, but definitely not 
the final goal of reconstruction of Chinese foreign investment law. 
 Naturally, a relatively modest third approach, which is somewhat similar to the 
model adopted by Argentina, was proposed. According to this theory, a codified foreign 
investment law shall be stipulated to govern issues particular to foreign investment. 
Meantime, domestic enterprise laws, namely the Company Law, the Partnership Law and 
the Sole Proprietorship Enterprise Law will be directly applied to the FIEs, thus extract 
the FIE laws from the foreign investment legal framework. Foreign investment laws, as 
they are in many other developing countries, are mainly laws of government regulations 
over foreign capital, rather than laws of corporate organization and corporate governance, 
i.e. FIE laws in China. As addressed above, the reason that FIE laws served as the core of 
foreign investment law for decades is due to the historical reasons that at the beginning of 
the Reform there was no Company Law (or Partnership Law and Sole Proprietorship 
Enterprise Law as well) at all. Therefore, application of Company Law, together with 
Partnership Law and Sole Proprietorship Enterprise Law, to FIEs is just to reshape the 
foreign investment law as they should have been, and it won’t necessarily remove the 
other foreign investment regulations as long as the needs to regulate foreign capitals 
through industry screening and other legal mechanisms still exists. Indeed, with the 
enterprise law section separated from the foreign investment legal regime, the unification 
and codification of foreign investment code would become much easier.  
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III. Proposal to the reconstruction of Chinese foreign investment law: A re-written 
FIE code in conjunction with the general application of domestic enterprise laws 
 1. Basic considerations in the reconstruction of Chinese foreign investment law 
 The evolution of Chinese foreign investment law is not a static process, but a 
dynamic one. It is motivated and influenced by many variables. In the long run, the 
ultimate goal of Chinese foreign investment law is, needless to say, to achieve a high 
level of unification of domestic investment legislation and foreign investment legislation, 
like most developed states doing currently. However, considering the economic 
development level of China, “junior period of socialist market economy” as defined by 
the Chinese government, China still need to protect its infant industries from foreign 
competition and keep a certain degree of control over foreign investment. Indeed, during 
the transition period, the foreign investment law and domestic economic legislation will 
co-exist for some longer time.255  
 Taking these realities into account, the proposal to remove foreign investment 
laws completely and generally apply domestic laws to FIEs appears to be too radical, 
because it disregards the practical demand to retain special foreign investment regulations 
in certain areas at the present stage and goes to the extremes. While the effect of the 
second approach is so limited that it cannot satisfy the need to apply national treatment to 
foreign investors in the near future. The problem is: an appropriate degree of 
consolidation of foreign investment law should be found to meet both the practical needs 
of further domestic economic reform and the future development of the outside legal 
environment, e.g. the WTO. Some of the contents in the current foreign investment law 
can be separated from the framework and in the meanwhile to incorporate the rest into a 
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single foreign investment code. Therefore, the author believes that the third approach 
could be the most plausible one at the moment. 
 Presently, the foreign investment law covers mainly three legal areas, namely, 
the corporate organization and governance of FIEs, administrative regulations, such as 
tax law, labor and social welfare law etc., and foreign investment policy. FIE laws can be 
separated from the foreign investment law framework and be reconstructed on the basis 
of the domestic enterprise laws (especially the Company Law as most FIEs would adopt 
company mode)256.  
 2. Reconstruction of FIE laws on the basis of domestic enterprise laws 
 Though comparatively the third approach, which separate the FIE laws from the 
foreign investment legal framework and generally apply domestic enterprise laws on 
FIEs, is more sound and plausible, it needs some further clarification and revision. Take 
Company Law as an example. Company Law shall be generally applied to FIE 
concerning its establishment, operation till its dissolution, but Company Law itself needs 
further modifications because it was enacted in 1993 and some of its stipulations have 
already appeared outdated. So, the FIE laws shall be reconstructed on the basis of the 
Company Law, instead of simply applying Company Law to FIEs. 
 The reason is, though the Company Law was passed fourteen years later than 
the first FIE law, the EJV Law, in some areas, the stipulations in the FIE laws are more 
reasonable and consistent with the international practices. For example, in the regulations 
on capital contribution, compared to the more flexible and efficient authorized capital 
system, the statutory capital system established by the Company Law seems to be too 
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stiff and should reversely model on the FIE laws. Another case is the responsibility of the 
shareholders’ meeting and board of directors stipulated by the Company Law. It is 
conceded that lack of the shareholders’ meeting is one of its structural defects of the FIE 
laws, but in comparison, the FIE laws’ provisions on the responsibility of board of 
directors are more reasonable. The Company Law confers too much responsibility on the 
shareholders’ meetings and obviously, some of these responsibilities, such as the right to 
make decisions concerning investment plan of the company, are obviously beyond the 
ken of the shareholders, some of whom may not have the expertise in the company’s 
business at all.  Still another example is the legality of sole proprietary LLC (limited 
liability company with only one shareholder). In the case of FIE, sole proprietary LLC is 
allowed in the form of a WFOE. But the Company Law do not allow establishment of 
sole proprietary LLC. Some Chinese scholars have called for the acknowledgement of 
sole proprietary LLC in future Company Law amendment in order to activate domestic 
private investment in hi-tech industries such as bioscience, software and Internet.257
 Therefore, merely applying the Company Law to FIEs is not enough, revising it 
to better serve the purpose of governing both domestic and foreign invested enterprises is 
also necessary. It is hoped that the new Company Law could combine the merits of the 
current Company Law and FIEs, while eliminate the defects and unreasonable 
stipulations from the current Company Law. 
 3. Contents that should be excluded from the Foreign Investment Code 
 Contents related to the corporate organization that bears the characteristic of 
commercial law shall not be written into the Foreign Investment Code. The reason is 
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simple: foreign investment laws, in the first place, are laws on the utilization and 
regulation of foreign capital, so the legislative focus of the Code should be placed on the 
regulation of “foreign capitals”; thus the contents of the law shall concentrate on the 
screening and admission of foreign capital, encouragement measures, etc. Foreign 
investment law and commercial law are laws of two different natures. 258  Foreign 
investment law belongs to the public law sphere. It involves the protection, 
encouragement and regulation of foreign capital by the state, thus it is a revelation of the 
public policy of the host state towards foreign investment. While the latter, the 
commercial law is based on the free will of the parties concerned.  
 Secondly, administrative laws on the intervention and control of macro 
economy by the state shall not be included in the Foreign Investment Code too. Started 
from early 1990s, China has already been on its way to unify some of its economic 
administrative laws governing domestic and foreign investment activities. For instance, in 
order to achieve unification in its tax law area, in December 1993, the NPC decided to 
apply the Value-added Tax Tentative Provisions of PRC, Consumption Tax Tentative 
Provisions of PRC and Business Tax Tentative Provisions of PRC to FIEs and foreign 
enterprises in China. Reform shall be continued along this direction and only the kind of 
issues that domestic enterprises cannot encounter shall be addressed by the foreign 
investment code. Say for example, employment and training of domestic staff by foreign 
invested companies and remittance of profit to home countries, etc.259
 4. Contents of the proposed Foreign Investment Code 
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 The following contents can be incorporated into the single Foreign Investment 
Code: 
 (i). Definition of foreign investment and foreign investors 
 Taking the future development in the foreign investment area into account, the 
definition of “foreign investment” could be extended to foreign portfolio investment, as 
with the further liberalization in Chinese securities and currency markets, it is believed 
that foreign portfolio investment may become more and more popular with foreign 
investors260. As to the definition of foreign investors, first, in the previous Chinese 
foreign investment legislations, nationality standard was employed in the judgment of 
foreign against domestic investors. This approach enables the “round-tripping” 
investment by domestic investors thus caused a lot of “fake foreign investment” in the 
practice. Therefore, in the Foreign Investment Code, it is better to combine “capital 
control standard” with “nationality standard” to judge the source of capital. Second, 
within a fairly long period of time, the investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau 
can still be treated as “foreign investors” in order to keep attracting investment from the 
above regions. 
 (ii). Foreign investment industrial guide 
 Foreign investment industrial guide contains contents of three aspects. The first 
aspect is entry screening, which the government screens the proposed foreign investment 
and decides whether to approve it or not261. Closely connected with the initial approval of 
a foreign investment are the provisions determining in what economic sectors a direct 
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http://business.sohu.com/10/61/column202416110.shtml 
261 See Yan Wang, supra note 12, at p70-71 
 115
foreign investment is forbidden or restricted. Not all forms of foreign investment are 
considered desirable. Some industries may be reserved for national investment. Trough 
regulations of foreign direct investment host counties seek to maximize the net benefit 
they receive and protect the national interests which is also indispensable for China. The 
third aspect is ownership regulations, which either reserve certain economic sectors for 
the state or its nationals, or allow for a certain percentage of foreign capital participation, 
or define certain sectors in which full or majority foreign ownership would be permitted. 
Often, the regulations fix the percentage of the requisite domestic capital participation262.  
 The current effective Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment 
Industry already contains the contents of the above three aspects and can be incorporated 
into the foreign investment code directly as one chapter. 
 (iii). Government administrations 
 In the part of “Government administrations”, the following issues could be 
addressed: government agencies in charge of the regulation of foreign investment and 
their respective responsibilities; government examination and approval procedures for the 
establishment of foreign investment projects.  
 In the current foreign investment legal framework, laws and regulations are 
seriously fragmented, therefore the regulatory authorities over foreign investment are 
numerous and sometimes their regulatory scope overlapped or conflicted with each other 
which brought much trouble and confusion to the foreign investors. It is expected that 
with a single code, such conflicts or overlaps of authority could be completely removed.  
 (iv). Protection of foreign investment 
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 Provisions on the treatment standard accorded to the foreign investors shall be 
included in this part.  In principle, national treatment should be applied to the foreign 
investor with only a few exceptions such as national security and public interests 
exception. And the interpretation for such exceptions shall be strictly limited to a narrow 
sense.  
 Expropriation and nationalization of foreign investment and compensation 
standard can also be addressed in this part. Nationalization used to be one of the major 
concerns of foreign investors when making investment in developing counties. But as the 
investment environment of developing countries became more and more friendly and 
hospitable to foreign investment, apprehension of nationalization and expropriation by 
the host state is no longer a foremost concern in their investment agenda. The Foreign 
Investment Code shall generally promise not to nationalize and expropriate the property 
of foreign investors, with the exception that in extremely necessary cases, e.g. out of 
national or public interests, the property of foreign investors can be nationalized or 
expropriated in due course and the damaged investor shall be entitled for appropriate 
compensation from the state. The procedures of pleading for judicial redress concerning 
the decision of nationalization or expropriation and application for compensation by the 
investor shall also be accorded to the investors in detail in the Foreign Investment Code. 
 (v). Encouragement measures and investment incentives 
 Admittedly, the glamour of preferential treatment and tax incentives to the 
foreign investors has no longer been as strong as it used to be, but it is still a powerful 
tool of the government to gear the direction of foreign investment into the industries and 
regions it desires. So in this part, the preferential treatment measures can be set out in 
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clear format. 263  However, after all, preferential policy to foreign investment is a 
temporary approach, so such contents should be gradually diminished from the Foreign 
Investment Code.  
   
Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 Reconstruction of Chinese foreign investment law is not a bold imagination, but 
a realistic legal design. Very much probably, under the composition of forces from WTO 
entry and further domestic market-oriented reform, in the near future, China will be 
confronted with an option: whether to continue to make small sews and mends to its 
gerontic foreign investment legal framework, or to make a major surgery on its structure. 
The resistance to such major legal reform can be understood and perceived, especially 
from the sectoral interests of various central Ministries and local governments264. The 
NPC is expected to exert more powers in such major legal reforms from its supreme law-
making capacity and coordination functions 265 . After all, reconstruction of Chinese 
foreign investment law will make China’s foreign investment rules more clear and 
systematic, which could in turn be more constructive and helpful to China’s effort to keep 
attracting foreign investment and continue its economic miracles in the 21st century.  
 
                                                 
263 See Weng Guomin, supra note 2, at p139 
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